Transborder Speech by Krotoszynski, Ronald J, Jr.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 94 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-2019
Transborder Speech
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.
University of Alabama Hugh F. Culverhouse, Jr. School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 473 (2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-DEC-18 11:53
ARTICLES
TRANSBORDER  SPEECH
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*
In an increasingly globalized marketplace of ideas, First Amendment law and theory must
recognize that the freedom of speech does not end at the water’s edge.  Simply put, the locus of
expressive activity should not prefigure the government’s ability to engage in censorship.  Never-
theless, under current First Amendment law and practice, the accident of geography may serve as
a constitutionally acceptable basis for content-based censorship of speech.  If, as the Supreme
Court argued with such ferocity in Citizens United, the value of speech to an audience does not
depend on the speaker’s identity or motive for speaking, then by parity of constitutional logic, the
locus of speech activity should be deemed no less irrelevant to its protected status under the First
Amendment.  After all, democratic deliberation, essential to the project of democratic self-govern-
ment, requires that information, ideas, and ideologies should be able to circulate freely among
and between voters in order to ensure that, to borrow a phrase from the iconic free speech theorist
Alexander Meiklejohn, “everything worth saying shall be said.”1  The foreign or domestic origin
of speech and speakers alike cannot serve as a constitutionally permissible basis for government
censorship of speech because, as Meiklejohn explained, “[t]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be
unfit for self-government.”2
The Warren Court pioneered the application of the First Amendment to protect transborder
speech (meaning speech that involves ideas, information, and speakers crossing national bound-
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aries).  To be sure, the Warren Court’s decisions were not particularly robust—yet they plainly
recognized that the value of speech to the electorate is simply not a function of its domestic or
foreign origin.  The Burger Court never overruled these Warren Court precedents—but it declined
to expand on them.  By way of contrast, however, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
declined to apply the First Amendment at full strength to transborder speech activities—and
arguably have resiled from the Warren Court precedents that protected transnational information
flows from government censorship.  If the Supreme Court’s efforts to prohibit the government from
distorting the political marketplace of ideas reflect a meaningful and serious jurisprudential
commitment—rather than a merely rhetorical one—a significant course correction is both needed
and long overdue.  In sum, a free and open marketplace of political ideas requires that trans-
border speech not constitute a poor relation of its healthier, more robust domestic first cousin.
INTRODUCTION: TRANSBORDER SPEECH, DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND
THE GLOBALIZED MARKETPLACE OF POLITICAL IDEAS
This Article considers an important, but largely overlooked and under-
appreciated, subset of First Amendment activity: transborder speech.  Trans-
border speech involves the exercise of freedom of speech, assembly,
association, press and petition across national borders; it relates to the global
information flows of people, ideas, knowledge, and argument.  Simply put, in
the age of the internet, the marketplace of ideas does not respect national
boundaries.3  Even though transborder speech constitutes an increasingly
important aspect of expressive freedom, it enjoys considerably less protection
than purely domestic speech activity.4
If the value of information and ideas is not a function of its source, as
the Supreme Court explained with great force in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,5 then it necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional
logic, that the locus of speech activity should be equally irrelevant to ascer-
taining the value of particular speech to the marketplace of ideas—or to the
process of democratic self-government.6  Professor Timothy Zick argues that
we “ought to treat American citizens’ rights to engage in speech, assembly,
3 See Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—
Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2010) (observing that “we live in a world
characterized by extraordinary advances in communications technology, widespread global
travel, increasing cross-border commerce, and frequent transnational involvements” and
“[i]nformation flows at great speed, and in remarkable quantity, across our national
borders”).
4 See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER
EXPRESSIVE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 66–68, 199–227 (2014).
5 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an essential mecha-
nism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . The
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is
a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”).
6 But cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–39 (2010) (upholding a
federal statute that, as applied, banned any contact with proscribed organizations abroad
on the theory that such contact inevitably constituted “material support” of them and
despite any evidence that the actual speech and associational activity at issue advanced
unlawful aims or objectives and notwithstanding Congress’s failure to narrowly tailor the
proscription in any way, shape, or form).
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petition, and press as fully portable.”7  Nevertheless, as Professors Burt
Neuborne and Steven R. Shapiro observed in 1985, “[r]ecent case law hardly
encourages optimism about the prospects for close judicial scrutiny of imped-
iments to the flow of information and ideas across the national border.”8
Moreover, from the vantage point of the Reagan era, “the trend probably
points in the opposite direction.”9  Subsequent judicial developments have
entirely borne out this baleful prediction.
As this Article will explain in some detail, transborder speech has never
enjoyed a strong claim on the First Amendment.  Moreover, despite its
merely modest protection under the Warren Court, the protection of trans-
border speech has declined, rather than increased, over time.  Even as the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have radically expanded the protection
afforded to domestic speech activity,10 transborder speech has remained
something of a First Amendment orphan.
The Warren Court pioneered the constitutional protection of trans-
border speech, affording such speech tentative, modest protection.11  The
7 Zick, supra note 4, at 215.
8 Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and
the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 765 (1985).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding
intentionally false speech about military honors to be protected under the First Amend-
ment); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protects the distribution of violent video games to minors); Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443 (2011) (holding outrageous and offensive protest at a deceased U.S. marine’s
funeral service and burial to be protected speech about a matter of public concern);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment protects
graphic depictions of animal cruelty); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
(holding intentionally outrageous and offensive parody of a public figure constitutes pro-
tected speech absent the inclusion of a false statement of fact made with malice
aforethought).
11 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating on First
Amendment grounds a federal statute that required postal service customers to request, in
writing, delivery of “communist political propaganda” in order to receive materials from
abroad that Post Office employees deemed to constitute such material and holding that
“[t]he regime of this Act is at war with the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and
discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505, 514, 517
(1964) (holding unconstitutional, on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, revocation
of a U.S. citizen’s passport because of membership in a Communist Party–affiliated organi-
zation and observing that foreign travel “is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights
of free speech and association”); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144, 150 (1958) (holding that
denial of a passport because of membership in a Communist-affiliated domestic organiza-
tion would be unconstitutional and declining to find statutory authority for such action);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 129–30 (1958) (holding that Congress did not convey
authority to deny passports to U.S. citizens “because of their beliefs or associations” and
noting that such authority, if granted, would raise “important constitutional questions”).
The Warren Court did not, however, always or invariably vindicate transborder speech
claims. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965) (upholding the U.S. government’s ban
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Burger Court halted the further extension of First Amendment protection
for transborder speech activity, but did not overrule the relevant Warren
Court precedents.12  The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, on the other hand,
effectively have resiled from the modest protection afforded to transborder
speech under the Warren Court.13
In the age of the internet, national boundaries should not impede the
free flow of information and ideas.  Yet, as Neuborne and Shapiro observe,
“America’s border has been permitted to evolve into a discernible impedi-
ment to the free flow of ideas.”14  The fact that speech crosses a border
should not affect its status under the First Amendment.  No necessary rela-
tionship exists between the geographic origin of speech or a speaker and its
potential utility to the project of democratic self-government.15
Professor Zick, one of the few contemporary legal scholars to consider
the application of the First Amendment to transborder speech in a compre-
on travel to Cuba and holding that the policy constituted merely “an inhibition of action”
rather than “speech” and observing that “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could
not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow”).  Nevertheless,
the passport cases and the foreign mail case, Lamont, afforded transborder speech non-
trivial First Amendment protection.
12 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306–09 (1981) (assuming that the First Amendment
protects a U.S. citizen’s interest in speaking in foreign venues to foreign audiences, but
holding that Agee’s prior unlawful leaking of CIA classified material justified the federal
government’s decision to revoke Agee’s passport); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
762–70 (1972) (recognizing that U.S. citizens have a cognizable First Amendment interest
in interacting, in person, with a foreign journalist who advocated Marxist ideologies, but
sustaining the federal government’s refusal to issue a visa for Mandel to travel to the
United States because the decision rested on “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason”
ostensibly unrelated to Mandel’s politics or ideology).
13 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (holding that U.S. citi-
zens and corporations that communicate electronically with persons in other countries
lacked standing to challenge the federal government’s mass surveillance program under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
1, 40 (2010) (upholding application of criminal sanctions against “material support” of
terrorist organizations based on the Humanitarian Law Project’s efforts to teach peaceful
and nonviolent conflict resolution techniques to members of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdi-
stan); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 n.10, 490–91
(1999) (rejecting a First Amendment objection to deportation proceedings that were alleg-
edly initiated because of the government’s antipathy toward the deportees’ First Amend-
ment activities); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–85 (1987) (upholding, against a First
Amendment compelled speech objection, a federal law that required the labeling of three
Canadian films “political propaganda” distributed by “foreign principals and their
agents”).
14 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 721.
15 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at xiii–xiv, 24–27, 91 (arguing that voters need all
relevant information in order to hold government accountable through the electoral pro-
cess and arguing that foreign speakers and ideas are no less potentially relevant to the
process of democratic deliberation than domestic speakers and ideas).  Professor
Meiklejohn posited that “[t]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-govern-
ment.” Id. at 27.
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hensive and sustained fashion,16 argues that “U.S. citizens ought to enjoy
protection for free speech, press, assembly, and petition rights without
regard to frontiers or borders.”17  Yet, in the United States and elsewhere,
governments routinely use the accident of geography as a basis for regulat-
ing—or even proscribing entirely—speech activity that would enjoy robust
constitutional protection but for its transborder characteristic.  In the con-
temporary United States, federal laws and regulations use control over the
border to suppress speech activity that the national government deems inimi-
cal to its diplomatic, military, and national security interests.18  For the most
part, and for reasons that the Supreme Court has never fully explained or
justified, crossing the nation’s borders provides a sound basis for disregard-
ing the First Amendment’s strictures.19
To provide one concrete example of the problem, consider that the abil-
ity of foreign speakers to enter the United States—and the ability of U.S.
citizens to travel abroad in order to inform themselves about issues of central
importance to matters of public concern in the United States—are subject to
pervasive regulation and control.  Moreover, these controls can be used, and
are used, to engage in viewpoint- and content-based censorship of speech.20
16 The paucity of writing on the status of transborder speech is startling.  As Professor
Zick observes, “[s]cholars, courts, and government officials have considered the First
Amendment’s domestic domain in exhaustive detail,” but “far less attention has been paid
to the manner in which First Amendment liberties intersect with and relate to interna-
tional borders.” ZICK, supra note 4, at 1.  In fact, only a handful of articles have been
written that address the question of how to map the First Amendment onto speech and
speakers that originate outside the United States.  Professors Zick and Neuborne have
authored the most comprehensive works on the subject.  See generally Neuborne & Shapiro,
supra note 8; Zick, supra note 3.  Other works that discuss transborder speech include
David Cole, Essay, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 147 (2012); Aziz Z. Huq, Essay,
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012);
Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008); Robert
D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information: First Amendment Issues, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 863 (1985); John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Govern-
ment, the Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988); Steven R. Sha-
piro, Commentary, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 930 (1987).  Remarkably, these works comprise the existing scholarly oeuvre.  The
failure of the U.S. legal academy to address issues associated with government efforts to
regulate or proscribe transborder speech is telling; the subject is sufficiently foreign (so to
speak) to contemporary concerns about expressive freedom that the body of literature
addressing it pales in comparison to the ink spilled analyzing the First Amendment protec-
tion afforded to low value speech, such as advertising, child pornography, and obscenity.
17 ZICK, supra note 4, at 212.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra notes 271–76 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010) (“Given the
sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at stake, the political branches
have adequately substantiated their determination that, to serve the Government’s interest
in preventing terrorism, it was necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form
of training, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if the
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Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project sustained a flat ban on any contact with
foreign organizations listed on a State Department terrorist group watch
list.21  The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) sought to teach peaceful dis-
pute resolution techniques, and principles of international law, to Kurdish
rebels (members of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK)).22  The Supreme
Court sustained the federal government’s criminal ban on this entirely peace-
ful, nonviolent, speech and associational activity.23  Chief Justice John Rob-
erts explained that “in regulating the particular forms of support that
plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pur-
sued that objective [national security] consistent with the limitations of the
First and Fifth Amendments.”24
Humanitarian Law Project raises very troubling questions about the rigor
with which the First Amendment will be applied in circumstances where U.S.
citizens seek to exercise First Amendment freedoms outside the United
States.25  As Professor David Cole has observed, “[f]or the first time in its
history, the Court upheld the criminalization of speech advocating only non-
violent, lawful ends on the ground that such speech might unintentionally
assist a third party in criminal wrongdoing.”26  In an increasingly globalized
marketplace of ideas, we need to ensure that First Amendment rights do not
end at the water’s edge.  Simply put, the locus of expressive activity should
not prefigure the government’s ability to engage in censorship, yet good evi-
dence exists that this is not really the case under current First Amendment
law and doctrine.27
This Article also considers the problems presented by national secur-
ity–based surveillance programs aimed at preventing crime.  Many of these
programs, such as those created under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
supporters meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent ends.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“We hold that when the Executive exercises this power [to con-
trol the entrance of foreign nationals into the United States] negatively on the basis of a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment inter-
ests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965) (“There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. . . . The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”). But cf. id. at 24
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The ability to understand this pluralistic world, filled with clash-
ing ideologies, is a prerequisite of citizenship if we and the other peoples of the world are
to avoid the nuclear holocaust.”).
21 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.
22 Id. at 10–11, 14.
23 See id. at 33–40.
24 Id. at 40.
25 See Cole, supra note 16, at 148–50; see also infra notes 264–76 and accompanying text
(discussing and critiquing Humanitarian Law Project and its unusually weak application of
strict judicial scrutiny).
26 Cole, supra note 16, at 149.
27 See ZICK, supra note 4, at 61–76, 126–31, 156, 215, 303.
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Act,28 use the transborder nature of communications as a basis for engaging
in surveillance of electronic communications without any individualized
showing that a particular person’s electronic communications might relate in
some way to unlawful activities.29
Pervasive forms of surveillance have a predictable and significant chilling
effect; simply put, surveillance programs based on big data present serious
threats to vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas.30  As Professor Neil Richards
observes, “[s]hadowy regimes of surveillance corrode the constitutional com-
mitment to intellectual freedom that lies at the heart of most theories of
political freedom in a democracy.”31  Nevertheless, the federal courts have
been very reticent to apply First Amendment values to these national security
programs that use the accident of crossing a national border as a basis for
justifying comprehensive data collection—particularly in the face of a widely
held perception that the risk of terroristic attacks is both real and growing.32
National security efforts, such as the PRISM program33 and other similar
activities sanctioned by section 215 of the Patriot Act,34 present some very
serious risks to the exercise of expressive freedoms.  A surveillance state may
be many things, but it is not likely to be a successful democracy.  Surveillance
produces a significant chilling effect that impedes democratic discourse—
something that the Court of Justice of the European Union noted in its
landmark Digital Rights Ireland decision.35  Surveillance can and does func-
28 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012).
29 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418–22 (2013).  For a discussion of
how the federal government conducts dragnet surveillance of U.S. citizens’ transborder
communications (without obtaining a warrant), see James Purce, Comment, Push It to the
(Constitutional) Limit: Strengthening the National Security Agency’s Section 702 Surveillance Pro-
gram, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (2018).
30 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945–47,
1950–52 (2013).
31 Id. at 1951.
32 See generally Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 115.
33 See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/
12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/?utm_term=.161c000cbfe5.
34 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863 (2012).
35 Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns,
Marine, and Nat. Res., 2014 E.C.R. 238, ¶¶ 28, 69–73, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/docu
ment/document.jsf?text=0&docid=150642&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=41538 (invalidating EU Directive 2006/24, which required the col-
lection and storage of literally all electronic communications, because of the lack of ade-
quate procedural and administrative safeguards, and observing that “retention of the data
in question might have an effect on the use, by subscribers or registered users, of the
means of communication covered by that directive and, consequently, on their exercise of
freedom of expression”).
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tion as a powerful tool for social control; programs like PRISM seriously bur-
den the exercise of expressive freedom by incenting self-censorship.36
Despite the risks to democratic self-government that mass surveillance
programs present, the Roberts Court has refused to even consider the consti-
tutional status of such programs on the merits, finding that U.S. citizens who
generally engage in telecommunications activities with people and institu-
tions located abroad lacked Article III standing to challenge the constitution-
ality of these mass surveillance programs because there was no present
injury.37  Because the federal government does not officially acknowledge
even the existence of some of these programs, much less provide a database
of persons whose electronic communications have been recorded and stored,
it is not possible for a would-be plaintiff to establish that her communications
have been surveilled.  In the absence of discovery, it is quite impossible for a
would-be plaintiff seeking judicial review of these programs to prove that Big
Brother has been watching and listening to her communications.
Yet, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court held that
the inability to assert with something approaching certainty the fact of gov-
ernment surveillance means that a would-be plaintiff lacks a concrete and
particularized injury in fact sufficient to establish constitutional standing.38
In consequence, mass surveillance programs that target transborder commu-
nications operate free and clear of judicial review.  The First Amendment
obviously cannot constrain the government’s spying on its citizens if the fed-
eral courts refuse to apply it.
The fact that many of these mass surveillance programs rely on the trans-
border nature of communications as a basis for government surveillance is
telling.  Clearly, the political branches of the federal government have fig-
ured out that the federal courts are unlikely to apply the First Amendment at
full strength to speech activity that takes place, even in part, outside the
United States.39  Because the Supreme Court has signaled that a junior var-
36 See Richards, supra note 30, at 1948 (observing that “surveillance inclines us to the
mainstream and the boring” and “menaces our society’s foundational commitments to
intellectual diversity and eccentric individuality”).  Professor Richards persuasively posits
that “[i]f we care about the development of eccentric individuality and freedom of thought
as First Amendment values, then we should be especially wary of surveillance of activities
through which those aspects of the self are constructed.” Id. at 1950.
37 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401–02, 422 (2013) (“We hold that
respondents lack Article III standing because they cannot demonstrate that the future
injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and because they cannot manufacture
standing by incurring costs in anticipation of nonimminent harm.”).
38 See id. at 418–22.
39 See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 83–90, 209–10 (2009) (discussing the “ple-
nary power” doctrine, which gives Congress very broad authority to regulate persons and
territory outside the boundaries of the fifty states and, with respect to the First Amend-
ment, observing that “[o]nly a few cases have ever considered the extraterritorial reach of
the First Amendment” and noting that “American judges have tended to deny its extraterri-
torial reach”).  Professor Zick points out, however, that “[s]ince the mid-1950s, the territo-
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sity version of the First Amendment applies to transborder speech, the acci-
dent of geography can be used as a basis for censoring speech that Congress
and the President dislike.  However, if content- and viewpoint-based speech
regulations are antithetical to the freedom of speech required for democracy
to function,40 the fact that speech has a transborder element should not
serve as a constitutionally sufficient basis for denying it the full protection of
the First Amendment.41
It has not always been thus.  The idea that transborder speech has at best
a very weak claim on the First Amendment is of relatively recent vintage and
reflects a break with precedents of the Warren Court.  To be sure, the War-
ren Court did not vigorously move to protect transborder speech activity.42
During the Warren Court years, however, the Justices issued opinions that
invoked the First Amendment to limit government efforts to censor speech
and associational activities with transborder characteristics that the political
branches not only disliked, but feared.43  These decisions were tentative and
halting—but they nevertheless brought First Amendment values to bear to
protect transborder First Amendment activity.
The Burger Court, by way of contrast, failed to expand on these prece-
dents.  When presented with opportunities to build on the work of its prede-
cessor, the Burger Court declined to extend Warren Court precedents and,
instead, distinguished them away.44  When doing so, however, the Burger
Court reiterated that government border regulations that burdened access to
information and ideas triggered the protection of the First Amendment.45
Thus, the Burger Court ratified prior holdings that applied the First Amend-
ment to transborder speech, but proceeded to uphold government regula-
tions that burdened or precluded transborder speech and association
activities.  It did so by finding that the government was regulating conduct,
rather than speech, and that the nonspeech justification for regulating con-
duct was consistent with the First Amendment.46
rial domain of constitutional liberties, including those set forth in the Bill of Rights, has
steadily expanded with respect to both citizens and aliens.”  Zick, supra note 3, at 1593.
40 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 24–27.
41 See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 942 (“The Bill of Rights, after all, was adopted to limit
the exercise of sovereign powers that are inconsistent with transcendent national values.”).
42 See infra Part I.
43 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305–07 (1965) (invalidating a
statute that significantly burdened the receipt of “communist political propaganda” mailed
from outside the United States because the law constituted “an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the addressee’s First Amendment rights”).
44 See infra notes 133–94 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming “that First Amendment
protections reach beyond our national boundaries” but holding that “Agee’s First Amend-
ment claim has no foundation”).
46 See id. at 309 (“To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit [the
owner of the passport], ‘it is an inhibition of action,’ rather than of speech.” (quoting
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965))).
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During the Rehnquist and Roberts Court eras, however, the Supreme
Court has moved to flatly deny First Amendment protection to transborder
speech activity.47  For example, the Supreme Court has upheld regulations
aimed at chilling the distribution of motion pictures produced abroad48 and
also sustained a federal law that criminalized any contact made abroad with
proscribed foreign organizations.49  In reaching these conclusions, the Jus-
tices have either declined to find the First Amendment implicated at all
(Meese v. Keene50) or applied a watered-down version of the First Amendment
that bears little relationship to its more rigorous, domestic first cousin
(Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project51).
Accordingly, and as this Article will demonstrate, it is not possible to
gainsay that the protection afforded transborder speech has decreased,
rather than increased, over time in the United States.  The federal govern-
ment has successfully invoked imperatives associated with diplomatic, mili-
tary, and national security concerns to justify content- and viewpoint-based
speech regulations that burden or completely prohibit First Amendment
activity based on the locus of the speech activity being outside the United
States.
As this Article will explain in greater detail, a perplexing asymmetry
exists in the contemporary Supreme Court’s approach to transborder speech
and corporate speech.  The Roberts Court has been remarkably protective of
corporate speech activity, positing that the value of information to an audi-
ence is not a function of the identity of the speaker or the speaker’s motive
for speaking.52  Thus, a corporation may claim the full protection of the First
Amendment when it speaks out on a matter of public concern or about a
candidate for public office.53  It is puzzling why speaker identity and motive
are irrelevant to the protected status of corporate speech about a matter of
public concern but afforded central and controlling weight in the context of
transborder speech.54
This Article proceeds in four main parts.  Part I considers the Warren
Court’s tentative efforts to map the First Amendment on to transborder
speech activity.  Even though these efforts were halting and limited, they rep-
resented a major theoretical and doctrinal innovation.  Prior to the Warren
47 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36–40 (2010).
48 See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
49 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39–40.
50 See infra notes 199–227 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 260–82 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–41 (2010).
53 See id. at 342 (“The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends
to corporations.”); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14, 784
(1978) (holding that the First Amendment protects corporate speech and noting the exis-
tence of “many decisions holding state laws invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment
when they infringe protected speech by corporate bodies”).  In Bellotti, the Supreme Court
held that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection “simply because its source is
a corporation.” Id. at 784.
54 See infra Part IV.
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Court, the Supreme Court had not suggested, much less held, that the First
Amendment had extraterritorial effect.55  Part II takes up the more cautious
approach of the Burger Court, which declined to build on the jurispruden-
tial foundations established by its predecessor.  To be sure, the Burger Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment applied to transborder speech but
was inclined to credit the federal government’s claims that foreign relations,
military affairs, and national security interests justified the imposition of sig-
nificant limits on transborder speech activity.
Part III discusses the diminution of transborder speech protection under
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  The most recent cases involving trans-
border speech either find no serious First Amendment interest or, worse still,
sustain transborder speech restrictions under a form of “strict scrutiny lite”.
Drawing on the iconic work of Alexander Meiklejohn, Part IV presents a sus-
tained argument in favor of affording transborder speech activities full and
robust First Amendment protection.  The Article then provides a brief over-
view and conclusion.
I. THE WARREN COURT AND TRANSBORDER SPEECH: TENTATIVE
RECOGNITION AND MODEST, BUT INCONSISTENT,
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The Warren Court recognized constitutional protection for interna-
tional travel, both as a liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and as an aspect of the First Amendment.  Travel provides
opportunities that advance important First Amendment interests, including
association, access to news and information, and education.  Thus, denial of a
passport, which has the effect of precluding international travel, implicates
the First Amendment.56  The Warren Court also held that the right to receive
news and information from abroad, including foreign political material, falls
within the scope of the First Amendment’s protection.57
55 But cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1957) (holding that the Bill of Rights
protects U.S. citizens located abroad and overruling In Re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), a
decision that held the contrary).  Justice Hugo Black explained that unacceptable conse-
quences would necessarily flow from holding the Bill of Rights inapplicable to U.S. citizens
when they are outside the United States:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when
expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flour-
ish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis
of our Government.  If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the
Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by
the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it
prescribes.
Id. at 14.
56 As a matter of historical record, foreign travel did not require a passport. See Kahn,
supra note 16, at 316 (“For most of American history, travel abroad was as unencumbered
as travel at home.  Passports were optional.”).
57 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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In Kent v. Dulles,58 the Warren Court first recognized the right to travel
abroad.  Writing for the five–four majority, Justice William O. Douglas
observed that “[t]he right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment.”59  Rockwell Kent sought to attend a “World Council of Peace” confer-
ence in England.60  The State Department’s Passport Office denied Kent’s
application for a passport because of an alleged association with the Commu-
nist Party.61  Kent sued, arguing that the denial of a passport based on his
political beliefs and associations violated the Constitution; Kent lost in both
the district court and before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.62
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.  Rather than reaching
the broader constitutional questions,63 the majority instead held that Con-
gress did not authorize the State Department to refuse to issue passports
based on a U.S. citizen’s political beliefs.64  Justice Douglas explained that it
would be mistaken to infer a power “to curtail in [the Secretary of State’s]
discretion the free movement of citizens in order to satisfy himself about
their beliefs or associations.”65  Thus, the majority held that the relevant stat-
utory provisions did “not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority exer-
cised here.”66
Strictly speaking, Kent does not directly hold that a constitutional right
to travel internationally exists; instead, it relies on a saving construction to
avoid reaching the larger constitutional question.67  Even so, Justice Doug-
las’s opinion strongly intimates that an express authorization to deny a pass-
port based solely on ideological beliefs or political associations would fail to
pass constitutional muster.68  He explained that “we deal here with a consti-
tutional right of the citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be
faithful to respect.”69  By way of contrast, the dissenting Justices would have
permitted the State Department to deny a passport when the applicant “is
58 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
59 Id. at 125.
60 Id. at 117.
61 See id. at 117–19.
62 Id. at 119–20.
63 Id. at 129 (noting that “we do not reach the question of constitutionality”).
64 Id. at 130.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 129.
67 Denial of a passport obviously raises serious constitutional questions and reflects
efforts to control domestic politics as much as efforts to protect foreign relations and
national security concerns. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35
FOREIGN AFF. 17, 18 (1956) (“Nearly every passport denial has been a decision to keep the
citizen here within the high walled fortress where he can be isolated, neutralized, kept, let
us say, to his accustomed and observable routines of malefaction.  It has been simply one
facet of our tactic of domestic security, and only incidentally a matter of foreign policy.”).
68 Kent, 357 U.S. at 130.
69 Id.
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going abroad with the purpose of engaging in activities that would advance
the Communist cause,”70 an approach that would have denied meaningful
protection to any and all transborder speech activities disapproved of by the
State Department.
The Supreme Court’s next major transborder speech case also involved
passports—more specifically, the revocation of passports based on the hold-
ers’ support of communist or socialist ideologies and organizations that advo-
cated for such causes.  In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,71 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed and extended its earlier ruling in Kent.72  The State Department
invoked authority under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (the
“Act”).73  The law prohibited the issuance or use of a passport by “any mem-
ber” of a Communist organization.74  On October 20, 1961, the federal gov-
ernment listed the Communist Party of the United States under the Act.75
Following this listing, the State Department notified Herbert Aptheker, as
well as Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, “that their passports were revoked.”76
Following the passport revocation, Aptheker and Flynn sought judicial
review of the State Department’s order on constitutional grounds; among
other constitutional claims, they argued that the order violated both due pro-
cess and First Amendment rights.77  A three-judge district court ruled in
favor of the State Department and against Aptheker and Flynn.78  The
Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding that the Act “too
broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges
the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”79
Justice Arthur Goldberg, writing for the six–three majority, found the
provision authorizing the passport revocations “unconstitutional on its face”
because it “swe[pt] too widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.”80  He explained that “[t]he prohibi-
tion against travel is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the
bare fact of organizational membership and the activity [that] Congress
sought to proscribe.”81  Because there was no requirement that the State
70 Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144, 154 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Kent, 357
U.S. at 131, 143 (Clark, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority’s conclusion “that the
Secretary has not been authorized to deny a passport to a Communist whose travel abroad
would be inimical to our national security” and arguing that the State Department pos-
sessed statutory authority “to deny petitioners’ applications for passports”).
71 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
72 See id. at 505.
73 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 501–02.
74 Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 501–02.
75 Id. at 502.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 503–04, 504 n.4.
78 Id. at 504–05.
79 Id. at 505.
80 Id. at 514.
81 Id.
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Department assess a citizen’s actual level of involvement with the Communist
Party on an individualized basis, the statute was not drawn with sufficient
narrow tailoring.82
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion even though Aptheker was
a leader of the Communist Party and the editor of Political Affairs, an official
publication of the Communist Party of the United States, and Flynn served as
Chair of the Communist Party of the United States.83  Aptheker sought to
visit Europe for “study,” “recreation,” and “to observe social, political and
economic conditions abroad, and thereafter to write, publish, teach and lec-
ture in this country about his observations.”84  In addition, he sought to
“attend meetings of learned societies and to fulfill invitations to lecture
abroad.”85  Flynn offered similar reasons for her desire to travel outside the
United States.86
Aptheker’s reasons for traveling abroad clearly and directly implicated
core First Amendment values; his proposed activities all involve the exercise
of the freedom of speech, assembly, and association.  Accordingly, it should
not be surprising that, in addition to the due process rationale, Justice
Goldberg also recognized the First Amendment implications of revoking a
passport in order to prevent the exercise of protected expressive freedoms:
“[S]ince freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights
of free speech and association, we believe that appellants in this case should
not be required to assume the burden of demonstrating that Congress could
not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting their travel.”87  Justice
Goldberg’s opinion clearly recognizes that citizens seek to go abroad in order
to exercise First Amendment freedoms and that this activity enjoys some mea-
sure of constitutional protection.
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, drew the link even more
directly.  He argued that “[f]reedom of movement is kin to the right of
assembly and to the right of association.”88  In his view, “[t]hese rights may
not be abridged.”89  Douglas posited that “[w]e cannot exercise and enjoy
citizenship in world perspective without the right to travel abroad.”90
The Warren Court’s most sweeping transborder speech decision, Lamont
v. Postmaster General,91 invalidated a federal statute that required written regis-
tration with the federal government in order to receive “communist political
82 Id.
83 Id. at 515.
84 Id. at 511 n.10.
85 Id.
86 Id. (reporting that Flynn sought to travel for, among other things, “study” and “to
observe social, political and economic conditions abroad, and thereafter to write, publish,
teach and lecture in this country about her observations”).
87 Id. at 517.
88 Id. at 520 (Douglas, J., concurring).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 521.
91 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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propaganda.”92  The statute provided that foreign material mailed to the
United States, and determined by the Postal Service to constitute “commu-
nist political propaganda,” would not be delivered to the recipient, but
instead “detained by the Postmaster General upon its arrival for delivery in
the United States.”93  The recipient would be notified of its availability and,
in order to receive the material, would have to notify the Post Office that the
material is “desired by the addressee.”94
Obviously, Congress intended this statute to have a predictable and
profound chilling effect on the willingness of U.S. residents to receive materi-
als from abroad that the Postal Service deemed to constitute communist
political propaganda.  Moreover, in order to receive such material, the postal
customer had to be willing to create a permanent record, in the form of a
reply card, informing the Postal Service in writing of her desire to obtain
such material.95
The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as facially unconstitutional.96
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Douglas explained that “the
Act as construed and applied is unconstitutional because it requires an offi-
cial act (viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exer-
cise of the addressee’s First Amendment rights.”97  Requiring a recipient to
request delivery of otherwise lawful books and periodicals “is almost certain
to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects those who have sensitive posi-
tions.”98  For example, many government employees, including school teach-
ers, “might think they would invite disaster if they read what the Federal
Government says contains the seeds of treason.”99  Moreover, “any addressee
is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal offi-
cials have condemned as ‘communist political propaganda.’”100
Concurring in the judgment, Justice William Brennan, joined by Justice
Goldberg, observed that “[t]hese might be troublesome cases if the address-
ees predicated their claim for relief upon the First Amendment rights of the
senders.”101  However, Lamont did not involve free speech claims by foreign
governments; instead “the addressees assert First Amendment claims in their
own right.”102  In Justice Brennan’s view, “the right to receive publications”
constitutes an important, indeed “fundamental” right, and “[t]he dissemina-
tion of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not
92 Id. at 302 (quoting Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-793, § 305(a), 76 Stat. 832, 840 (repealed 2012)).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 303.
96 Id. at 307.
97 Id. at 305.
98 Id. at 307.
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-793, § 305(a), 76 Stat. 832, 840 (repealed 2012)).
101 Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 308.
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free to receive and consider them.”103  In other words, “[i]t would be a bar-
ren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”104
Unlike the passport decisions—Aptheker, Kent, and Dayton, which all fea-
tured a badly divided Supreme Court—Lamont was a unanimous decision.105
Not a single member of the Supreme Court dissented from the ruling.  Per-
haps this was so because, as Justice Douglas observed, the regulatory scheme
before the Court was “at war with the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’
debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment.”106
Or, as Justice Brennan stated the point, “inhibition as well as prohibition
against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to
government.”107
It is quite clear that foreign governments seeking to disseminate propa-
ganda have no protected constitutional interest in using the U.S. mail service
to accomplish this objective.  Thus, Lamont does not suggest, much less hold,
that Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election in the United
States have any purchase on the First Amendment whatsoever.108  But, even
if foreign governments lack any protected speech rights, or right to access
the U.S. marketplace of ideas, U.S. citizens have a right to receive and con-
sider what foreign governments have to say.109
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 307 (majority opinion).
106 Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
107 Id. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
108 See Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through
Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/tech-
nology/facebook-google-russia.html (“Russian agents intending to sow discord among
American citizens disseminated inflammatory posts that reached 126 million users on
Facebook, published more than 131,000 messages on Twitter and uploaded over 1,000
videos to Google’s YouTube service . . . .”); Greg Miller et al., Obama’s Secret Struggle to
Punish Russia for Putin’s Election Assault, WASH. POST (June 23, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/national-security/obama-putin-election-
hacking/ (reporting the Russian President Vladimir Putin issued “specific instructions”
aimed at achieving “[an] audacious objective[ ],” namely to “defeat or at least damage the
Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, and help elect her opponent, Donald Trump”).  It
bears noting that the advertising buys undertaken by the Russian government on
Facebook, Google, and Twitter constituted a minute portion of the total paid political
advertising related to the 2016 presidential election—perhaps $100,000 in total on
Facebook and about $60,000 in Russian-related ad buys on Google (with only around
$5000 in purchases by the Russian Internet Research Agency). See Isaac & Wakabayashi,
supra.  Russian-related political communications also comprised a “minuscule amount” of
the total political communications related to the 2016 presidential election circulating on
Facebook, Google, and Twitter. See id.
109 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 91 (arguing that, under the First Amendment,
“such books as Hitler’s Mein Kampf, or Lenin’s The State and Revolution, or the Communist
Manifesto of Engels and Marx, may be freely printed, freely sold, freely distributed, freely
read, freely discussed, freely believed, freely disbelieved, throughout the United States” not
to safeguard “the financial interests of a publisher, or a distributor, or even of a writer” but
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As Meiklejohn so forcefully explained, the foreign source of ideas and
inspiration is irrelevant to their potential relevance to the ongoing project of
democratic self-government.  For democratic self-government to work, “the
citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under their own
institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can
be said in favor of those institutions, everything that can be said against
them.”110  Thus, Lamont protects the right of U.S. citizens to receive commu-
nist political propaganda through the mail because a power to censor ideas,
through the expedient of censorial postal regulations, is a power to control
political thought—and such a power simply cannot be reconciled with a
meaningful commitment to the process of democratic self-government.111
The accident of the materials at issue in Lamont originating with a for-
eign government, and from outside the United States, could have been used
as a basis for denying them any meaningful First Amendment protection.
Under the plenary power doctrine,112 the federal government has nearly
unfettered discretion to control who may enter the United States and who
may seek lawful resident status or naturalization as citizens.113  It would not
require much of a jurisprudential stretch to extend the plenary power doc-
rather because intense ongoing examination of our government is essential to its proper
functioning).
110 Id.
111 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1971) (invalidating Cohen’s conviction
for disturbing the peace based on his public display of a jacket emblazoned with the word
“fuck” and explaining that “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process”
and that permitting such regulation of speech as offensive conduct would encourage gov-
ernments to “seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for ban-
ning the expression of unpopular views”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California:
“Inconsequential” Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1996) (“By distin-
guishing the question of full and free public debate from the particular content of the
message (or the nature of the messenger), Justice Harlan vindicated the individual citi-
zen’s right to hold and share political views within the marketplace of ideas, and to com-
municate those ideas in unconventional—or even patently offensive—ways.”).
112 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 39, at 83–87.  It bears noting, however, that the plenary
power doctrine does not imply the constitutional authority to violate the constitutional
rights of lawfully present aliens. See id. at 55 (“The result is a system that permits largely
unfettered discretion in the process of admitting or expelling aliens, but requires fair treat-
ment while the aliens are within the United States.”).
113 See Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123–24 (1967) (“It
has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbid-
den.”); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (positing that “[p]olicies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political
conduct of government” and observing that the principle that “the formulation of these
policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the
legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government”); Harisi-
ades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (holding that Congress’s powers over immi-
gration and the national border “are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference”).
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trine to use the nation’s border as a basis for excluding foreign material—in
this instance, communist political propaganda—from the United States.  Yet,
Lamont does not feature even a single vote for this outcome; censoring what
U.S. citizens may read lies beyond the legitimate scope of the federal govern-
ment’s powers (even when control over the nation’s borders is implicated in
the speech activity).
Unfortunately, the Warren Court was not consistent in affording serious
First Amendment protection to transborder First Amendment activities.  In
Zemel v. Rusk,114 the Warren Court refused to credit a First Amendment
claim that a U.S. citizen has a right to travel to Cuba.115 Zemel constitutes an
important exception to the Warren Court’s generally protective approach to
transborder speech claims.
In 1962, Louis Zemel sought a visa permitting him to “travel to Cuba as a
tourist.”116  The State Department denied the visa application.117  In Octo-
ber 1962, Zemel renewed his request notwithstanding the State Department’s
denial of his initial request.118  Zemel elaborated on his reasons for seeking
to travel to Cuba, explaining that he wanted to learn about the current state
of affairs on the island in person so as to make himself “a better informed
citizen.”119  The State Department again denied the visa application.120
Zemel responded to this second denial by filing suit in federal district court,
asserting that the visa denial burdened his First Amendment rights.121  A
three-judge district court dismissed his claim and entered summary judgment
for the State Department.122  Zemel appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order.123  The State
Department had statutory authority to deny Zemel’s visa application; moreo-
ver, doing so did not violate the First Amendment.124  Chief Justice Earl War-
ren, writing for a six–three majority, explained that “we cannot accept the
contention of appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is
involved.”125  He characterized the visa denial as merely a regulation of
“action” rather than “speech,” observing that “[t]here are few restrictions on
action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of
114 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
115 Id. at 16.
116 Id. at 3.
117 Id. at 3–4.
118 Id. at 4.
119 Id. at 4.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 4, 16.
122 Id. at 4–5.
123 Id. at 20.
124 Id. at 13, 16.
125 Id. at 16.
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decreased data flow.”126  Accordingly, “[t]he right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”127
Justice Douglas dissented vigorously, positing that “[t]he ability to
understand this pluralistic world, filled with clashing ideologies, is a prerequi-
site of citizenship if we and the other peoples of the world are to avoid the
nuclear holocaust.”128  He characterized Kent as a freedom of speech deci-
sion, arguing that it “reflected a judgment as to the peripheral rights of the
citizen under the First Amendment.”129  Travel to other nations, for the pur-
pose of seeking information about foreign peoples and cultures, and the
opportunity to learn from such experiences, “gives meaning and substance to
freedom of expression and freedom of the press.”130  In light of these free
speech values, “[r]estrictions on the right to travel . . . should be so particu-
larized that a First Amendment right is not precluded unless some clear
countervailing national interest stands in the way of its assertion.”131
In sum, the Warren Court applied the First Amendment to protect trans-
border speech but did so in contexts where the locus of the First Amendment
activity being protected was domestic.  The State Department attempted to
deny passports not based on concerns about what the citizen would do
abroad, but instead based on purely domestic political activity—namely,
membership and participation in the Communist Party.  So too, Lamont pro-
tected the right of persons in the United States to receive foreign materials—
not the right of U.S. citizens to go abroad for the purpose of disseminating
speech.  Even though Lamont, Aptheker, and Kent implicated transborder
expressive activity, the First Amendment claims at issue in all three decisions
involved government actions that placed burdens on domestic speech and
associational activity as well.
II. THE BURGER COURT AND TRANSBORDER SPEECH:
RETRENCHMENT AND GRUDGING ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S APPLICATION TO TRANSBORDER SPEECH
The Burger Court declined to extend the Warren Court’s transborder
speech precedents and instead distinguished them away to sustain govern-
ment burdens on transborder speech—specifically foreign speakers entering
the United States132 and U.S. citizens traveling abroad to speak.133  The Bur-
ger Court’s transborder speech precedents acknowledge that the First
Amendment applies to such speech—but nevertheless find that the federal
government had acted constitutionally and for reasons wholly unrelated to
126 Id. at 16–17.
127 Id. at 17.  It bears noting that “[g]overnment restrictions on travel abroad have a
long and unfortunate history in this country.”  Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 733.
128 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 26.
132 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
133 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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suppression of speech based on content or viewpoint (a dubious conclusion
based on the facts at bar).
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Supreme Court sustained the Nixon admin-
istration’s decision to refuse Ernest E. Mandel an entry visa.134  Mandel, a
Belgian journalist, served as the editor of a socialist publication, La Gauche
(“The Left”); he was also an accomplished Marx-Engels scholar and had pub-
lished works on communist political theory.135  In September 1969, Mandel
applied for a visa for entry into the United States in order to attend an aca-
demic meeting at Stanford University, in Palo Alto, California.136  Famed
economist John Kenneth Galbraith was to serve as the keynote speaker at this
conference.137  Mandel was to speak on a panel discussion following Gal-
braith’s address.138  After Mandel’s invitation to speak at Stanford University
became publicly known, Mandel received additional speaking invitations,
including invitations from “Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Vassar.”139
The U.S. Consulate in Brussels rejected Mandel’s visa application in
October 1969.140  The State Department, in a formal letter denying the visa
application, claimed that Mandel had violated the terms of his 1968 visa by
“engag[ing] in activities beyond the stated purposes” and that his extended
activities “represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to
express his views in this country.”141  Thus, Mandel was denied lawful entry to
the United States and was unable to speak in person to the various audiences
that wished to hear his views.142
Mandel, joined by a number of U.S. citizens, all university professors
who wished to hear and interact with Mandel in person, brought suit in
March 1970 to challenge the visa denial.143  A three-judge district court
found the relevant immigration statutes invalid as applied to Mandel on
these facts and ordered the State Department to provide him with an entry
visa.144  The ruling rested not on Mandel’s right to enter the United States
134 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 756–60, 770.
135 Id. at 756.
136 See id. at 756–57.
137 Id. at 757.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 757.
140 Id. at 756–57.
141 Id. at 758–59.
142 Id. at 759.  The relevant statutory provisions actually created a shared responsibility
for a waiver from a federal law that barred the admission of persons advocating communist
ideologies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).  The relevant language authorizes a waiver of the
ban against issuing an entry visa to any alien who advocates, writes, or publishes “the eco-
nomic, international, and government doctrines of [w]orld communism” on the recom-
mendation of the State Department, and with the concurrence of the Attorney General.
Id. § 1182(a)(28)(D).  In Mandel’s case, the State Department actually recommended that
a waiver be approved for the visit, but the Department of Justice refused to approve this
recommendation. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 759.
143 Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d sub nom. Kleindienst,
408 U.S. 753.
144 Id. at 634.
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for the purpose of public speaking, but rather on the interest of U.S. citizens
in hearing and interacting with him.145  Judge John F. Dooling, Jr., writing
for the majority, explained that “[t]he nature of the First Amendment rights
as a retained attribute of the sovereignty of the people is reflected in the
emphasis that recent adjudications particularly have given to the ‘the right to
hear.’”146
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the Kleindienst majority, did not con-
test the lower court’s conclusion that the First Amendment protected audi-
ence autonomy, including the right to hear and receive ideas from non-U.S.
sources and speakers.147  Moreover, this right to receive information has par-
ticular salience in the context of “our schools and universities.”148  Justice
Blackmun considered and squarely rejected the government’s argument that
U.S. citizens could access Mandel’s ideas and opinions through means other
than in-person real-time communication.149  Direct personal communication
involves “particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, dis-
cussion and questioning.”150  Thus, the “existence of other alternatives” did
not “extinguish[ ] altogether any constitutional interest on the part of appel-
lees in this particular form of access.”151  Thus, as one commentator has
observed, Mandel “recognizes that a policy of ideological exclusions has
important constitutional consequences for American citizens and therefore is
subject to constitutional scrutiny.”152
On the other hand, under the plenary power doctrine, Congress pos-
sesses very broad discretion to admit or exclude noncitizens from entering
the United States.  Congress has “plenary power to make rules for the admis-
sion of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.”153  Moreover, “the formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress,” a principle that “has become about as
firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as
any aspect of our government.”154  Accordingly, in light of this vast discre-
tion, Mandel’s supporters did not claim that the First Amendment precluded
Congress from barring issuance of a visa to Mandel, but rather that the exis-
tence of a waiver procedure meant that the executive branch could not exer-
145 Id. at 630–34.
146 Id. at 630.
147 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762–63.
148 Id. at 763.
149 See id. at 765.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Shapiro, supra note 16, at 942 n.75; see also Zick, supra note 3, at 1553 (“In a portion
of the opinion that may come to have particular salience in the digital era, the Court noted
that the mere possibility that the message could be delivered by means other than face-to-
face interaction with the speaker did not satisfy First Amendment concerns.”).
153 Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
154 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
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cise its discretionary authority in a way that reflected viewpoint
discrimination.155
The Supreme Court ultimately dodged the question of whether the State
Department could bar Mandel based on his political and ideological beliefs,
depriving a U.S. audience of the right to interact with him in person, because
the government proffered a “facially legitimate and bona fide” alternative
basis for Mandel’s exclusion.156  The State Department denied the waiver
“because [it] concluded that previous abuses by Mandel made it inappropri-
ate to grant a waiver again.”157  Thus, when the executive branch uses discre-
tionary authority to exclude an alien “on the basis of a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amend-
ment interests of those who seek personal communication” with a visa appli-
cant.158  In the absence of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason
unrelated to the suppression of information and ideas, a meritorious First
Amendment claim might exist.159
Justice Douglas vigorously dissented, arguing that the government
applied an “ideological test”160 to deny Mandel a visa and that “[t]hought
control is not within the competence of any branch of government.”161  In
his view, persons living in the United States “may need exposure to the ideas
of people of many faiths and many creeds to further their education,” and,
accordingly, the federal courts should have narrowly construed the State
Department’s statutory authority to deny a visa based on antipathy toward a
speaker’s likely message.162
Justice Thurgood Marshall also dissented, characterizing the stated rea-
son for denying Mandel a waiver as completely pretexual: “There is no basis
in the present record for concluding . . . ‘flagrant abuse’—or even willful or
knowing departure—from visa restrictions.”163  The State Department, in
point of fact, had found that these restrictions were not communicated to
Mandel, so that he could not fairly be charged with violating conditions that
155 See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 767 (“They argue that the Executive’s implementation of
this congressional mandate through [the] decision whether to grant a waiver in each indi-
vidual case must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like appellees.”).
156 Id. at 769.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 770.
159 Id. (“What First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking exer-
cise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither
address nor decide in this case.”).
160 Id. at 770 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 772.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 944–45 (“Every
sovereign nation has the right to control its borders.  But in a nation premised on the
notion that sovereignty flows from the popular will and that the popular will is determined
by political debate, ideological exclusions cannot be justified.”).
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he did not know existed in the first place.164  Justice Marshall seems to have
the better of this argument.
Marshall posited that the government’s real reason for denying Mandel’s
visa application was its “desire to keep certain ideas out of circulation in this
country,” and “[t]his is hardly a compelling governmental interest.”165  He
wryly observed that “[n]othing is served—least of all our standing in the
international community—by Mandel’s exclusion.”166  Mandel’s exclusion
constituted a departure “from the basic traditions of our country, its fearless
acceptance of free discussion.”167
Mandel thus reaffirmed the holding of Lamont and acknowledged that
the First Amendment protects the interest of a U.S. audience in receiving
ideas and information from abroad.  At the same time, however, it credited
what appeared to be an entirely pretextual reason offered to support denial
of entry to a world-famous Marx scholar and journalist.  Justice Blackmun,
and the Mandel majority, clearly placed a thumb on the scale in order to find
that the real reason for Mandel’s exclusion was his failure to comply with
limitations on his speaking engagements when he was in the United States in
1968.
Mandel leaves the law more or less as it existed after Lamont: the geo-
graphic locus of ideas and information does not prefigure its protected status
under the First Amendment.  Audience autonomy, not the plenary power
doctrine, should control with respect to the right of U.S. citizens to read and
hear news, ideas, and points of view.  However, provided that the federal gov-
ernment does not facially target speech qua speech for regulation, it may use
powers related to its plenary power over the borders to take actions that bur-
den or preclude U.S. would-be audiences from reading, hearing, or seeing
foreign speakers.
In other words, even as the Mandel Court invoked Lamont and reaf-
firmed its central holding, it adopted the Zemel Court’s approach to assessing
the consistency of federal government action regarding control over the
nation’s borders.  The visa denial was not about speech—it was merely about
conduct (or “action,” to use the precise language from Zemel).168  To be sure,
and as Professor Zick has observed, “U.S. restrictions on the cross-border
movement of citizens have long affected cross-border political, intellectual,
academic, social, artistic, and religious exchanges.”169  Although Mandel
acknowledges the importance of transborder interactions between U.S. citi-
164 See Kleindienst, 407 U.S. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 784.
166 Id. at 785.
167 Id.; see Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 767 (“Once the focus is shifted from
the foreign speaker, who has no first amendment rights, to the American audience, which
possesses full first amendment rights, the issue of judicial capacity in national border cases
involving content-based censorship largely disappears.”); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 945
(“The suppression of speech is surely not the answer in a constitutional democracy.”).
168 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
169 ZICK, supra note 4, at 30.
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zens and the wider world and holds that the First Amendment affords signifi-
cant protection to such interactions, the credulousness with which the
majority accepted a clearly pretextual basis for denying Mandel a visa grossly
disserved core First Amendment values and the process of democratic
deliberation.
The Burger Court adopted a largely identical approach in Haig v.
Agee,170 holding that the First Amendment protected a right to travel abroad,
but finding that the government’s decision to revoke Philip Agee’s passport
was unrelated to concerns about the content or viewpoint of his speech but
instead related solely to Agee’s conduct, namely, unlawful disclosure of
national security information.171  Agee had worked for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) from 1957 to 1968 and had personal knowledge of “cov-
ert intelligence gathering in foreign countries.”172  In the 1970s, Agee
embarked on a public campaign to “out” secret CIA operatives, as well as to
release classified intelligence information to facilitate holding the Agency
publicly accountable for its actions.173
In December 1979, the State Department revoked Agee’s passport based
on the Department’s conclusion that his “activities abroad are causing or are
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of
the United States.”174  Agee brought suit in federal district court and pre-
vailed;175 the court of appeals affirmed this decision.176  The lower federal
courts found that Congress had not authorized the regulation used to revoke
Agee’s passport.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
acknowledged that Agee’s actions “may be considered by some to border on
treason,”177 but nevertheless concluded that the State Department had
exceeded its lawful statutory authority because the court was “bound by the
law as we find it.”178  The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.179
Agee clearly presented serious First Amendment issues—at the heart of
Agee’s program was an effort to disclose covert CIA operations in foreign
countries, activity that certainly involved public officials and matters of public
concern.180  It might seem startling to posit that the unlawful disclosure of
170 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
171 Id. at 304–06.
172 Id. at 283.
173 Id. at 283–85.
174 Id. at 286 (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b) (1980)).
175 Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Agee v. Muskie,
629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Haig, 453 U.S. 280.
176 Muskie, 629 F.2d at 87.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 87.
179 Haig, 453 U.S. at 310.
180 Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964); see also Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 626–46 (1990) (discussing in some
detail the concept of a matter of public concern and how discourse about matters of public
concern helps to facilitate the project of democratic deliberation).
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classified intelligence information constitutes speech about a matter of pub-
lic concern, but as Professor Robert Post has explained, “[f]rom the perspec-
tive of the logic of democratic self-governance, any restriction of the domain
of public discourse must necessarily constitute a forcible truncation of possi-
ble lines of democratic development.”181  This does not mean, of course, that
public discourse may never be truncated to advance important government
interests, but it does mean that the concept’s “periphery will remain both
ideological and vague, subject to an endless negotiation between democracy
and community life.”182
Then-Justice, and later Chief Justice, William Rehnquist found that the
State Department had established a clear policy of revoking passports to pre-
vent a “substantial likelihood of serious damage to the national security or
foreign policy of the United States.”183  He also emphasized that the grava-
men of the administrative action was “conduct” rather than speech—the
State Department’s policy existed to prevent “conduct likely to cause serious
damage to our national security or foreign policy.”184 Kent was not apposite
because the policy of denying U.S. passports to members of the Communist
Party had not been consistently enforced and also because “[t]he Kent Court
had no occasion to consider whether the Executive had the power to revoke
the passport of an individual whose conduct is damaging the national security
and foreign policy of the United States.”185  Justice Rehnquist emphasized
that “Kent involved denials of passports solely on the basis of political beliefs
entitled to First Amendment protection.”186
Accordingly, on the facts presented, “Agee’s First Amendment claim
ha[d] no foundation,” even assuming “that First Amendment protections
reach beyond our national boundaries.”187  Agee’s disclosures certainly con-
stituted speech, but they were also conduct—conduct aimed at “obstructing
intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel,” goals
and objectives “clearly not protected by the Constitution.”188  Justice Rehn-
quist emphasized that “[t]he mere fact that Agee is also engaged in criticism
of the Government does not render his conduct beyond the reach of the
law.”189  Moreover, even after revocation of his passport, “Agee is as free to
criticize the United States Government as he was when he held a passport—
always subject, of course, to express limits on certain rights by virtue of his
[employment] contract with the Government.”190  Justice Rehnquist also
181 Post, supra note 180, at 683.
182 Id. at 684.
183 Haig, 453 U.S. at 302–03.
184 Id. at 303.
185 Id. at 303–04.
186 Id. at 304.
187 Id. at 308.
188 Id. at 309.
189 Id. But cf. Kamenshine, supra note 16, at 894 (“Permission to travel [should] not be
denied for the purpose of punishing the traveler for his political views or attempting to
skew scientific or political debate.”).
190 Haig, 453 U.S. at 309.
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found no evidence of either “subterfuge to punish criticism of the Govern-
ment” or “any basis for a claim of discriminatory enforcement.”191
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, not on the point of whether
passport revocation could occur on the facts presented, but rather on
whether Congress had, in point of fact, authorized the State Department to
adopt the regulation used to effect the revocation of Agee’s passport.192
Moreover, the federal government had not established that Congress had
implicitly sanctioned the policy reflected in the regulations.193  The dissent,
then, was about Congress’s responsibility for clearly authorizing the policy,
and not whether such a policy, if plainly authorized, would violate the First
Amendment.194
Whatever the shortcomings of Agee, the majority takes pains to acknowl-
edge the Warren Court’s precedents holding that the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to travel abroad for the purpose of engaging in expressive
activities. Agee, like Mandel, does not resile from the Warren Court’s hold-
ings that extend First Amendment protection to transborder speech.  To be
sure, both cases are more broadly deferential to the federal government’s use
of control over visas and passports than the relevant Warren Court deci-
sions—yet neither case suggests that First Amendment rights stop at the
water’s edge.
It would be quite fair to say that the Burger Court declined to build on
the Warren Court’s transborder speech precedents—but it would be off the
mark to say that the Burger Court overruled or ignored them.  One can per-
ceive, however, a clear and discernable shift toward a posture of greater judi-
191 Id. at 309 n.61.
192 Id. at 312–13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress must clearly author-
ize a power to revoke a citizen’s passport and observing that “there is no dispute here that
the Passport Act of 1926 does not expressly authorize the Secretary to revoke Agee’s
passport”).
193 See id. at 314–15.
194 Justice Brennan did object to the deferential standard of review that the majority
applied to the First Amendment questions raised by the State Department’s revocation of
Agee’s passport based on his past speech.  In his view, “the Court’s responsibility must be to
balance that infringement against the asserted governmental interests to determine
whether the revocation contravenes the First Amendment.” Id. at 320 n.10.  This might
have been a more intellectually honest approach; the majority essentially engages in such a
balancing exercise but finds the federal government’s interests in foreign affairs and
national security overbear Agee’s interest in exercising his First Amendment rights abroad.
Justice Brennan’s proposed approach essentially constitutes a call for proportionality analy-
sis.  Proportionality analysis involves a reviewing court acknowledging that a fundamental
right, in this case, expressive freedoms safeguarded by the First Amendment, has been
burdened, but nevertheless gives the government an opportunity to demonstrate that the
burden is justified because it relates to a pressing and substantial government objective,
directly advances that objective, and is otherwise narrowly tailored to minimize the adverse
effects on the constitutional right at issue. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 112 (Can.);
see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
(David Dyzenhaus & Adam Tomkins eds., Doron Kalir trans., 2012); Vicki C. Jackson, Con-
stitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015).
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cial deference toward the political branches with respect to efforts to regulate
speech activity abroad that has the potential for undermining U.S. foreign
policy or national security objectives.  This trend grew and accelerated under
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.
III. RETROGRESSION: THE REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS’ FAILURE TO
AFFORD MEANINGFUL PROTECTION TO TRANSBORDER
SPEECH ACTIVITY
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have plainly permitted the federal
government to restrict the exercise of First Amendment rights based on the
transborder character of expressive activities.  For example, the Rehnquist
Court declined to follow Lamont and permitted the federal government to
discourage the dissemination within the United States of films funded in part
by foreign governments.195  In addition, it applied the plenary power doc-
trine to permit targeted deportations that allegedly reflected the federal gov-
ernment’s hostility to the deportees’ political associations and activities in the
United States.196  Both decisions represent clear, clean breaks with the ana-
lytical approach and precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts.
The Roberts Court continued the Rehnquist Court’s de facto policy of
declining to afford transborder speech significant First Amendment protec-
tion.  It refused to reach the merits of a challenge to a federal government
spying program that targeted all domestic communications with persons or
institutions located outside the United States.197  Even more depressing, the
Roberts Court sustained a content-based ban on speech abroad with mem-
bers of proscribed terrorist organizations—on pain of criminal indictment
and imprisonment for lending “material support” to such organizations.198
In fact, Humanitarian Law Project rests on premises fundamentally inconsis-
tent with Aptheker, Kent, and even Agee.  For the first time, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government may treat otherwise peaceful, nonviolent
speech abroad about a matter of public concern as a crime, despite any
direct connection between the transborder speech activity and unlawful activ-
ities—whether in the United States or abroad.
The Supreme Court’s retrenchment project commenced in Meese v.
Keene, a case that involved coerced speech aimed at discouraging the circula-
tion of films and periodicals produced with foreign government funding.199
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) requires persons who
distribute within the United States films and periodicals funded by foreign
governments to register as “agents of foreign principals.”200  Barry Keene, a
California state senator, wished to arrange for public showings of three films
195 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–82 (1987).
196 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487–92 (1999).
197 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401–02 (2013).
198 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–40 (2010).
199 Keene, 481 U.S. at 467–68.
200 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (1982).
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produced with support from the National Film Board of Canada; two of the
films addressed the adverse environmental effects of acid rain and the third
was about the potential catastrophic environmental effects of nuclear war.201
The FARA required the films to be registered with the Department of
Justice and labeled as foreign “political propaganda” distributed at the behest
of a “foreign principal.”202  The law required “such political propaganda” to
be “conspi[c]uously marked at its beginning with, or prefaced or accompa-
nied by, a true and accurate statement” describing the material’s source.203
The statute also required the exhibitor to provide a formal statement to the
recipients of the materials that identifies “su[c]h agent of a foreign principal
and such political propaganda and its sources.”204  The FARA defined “politi-
cal propaganda” quite broadly to encompass “any oral, visual, graphic, writ-
ten, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person.”205
Thus, as in Lamont, a person seeking to obtain information from abroad had
to register with the federal government and, in addition, to distribute a
mandatory disclosure form when exhibiting the material to the public.206
The district court found that the FARA’s registration and mandatory dis-
closure requirements had a profound chilling effect, coerced speech, and
hence violated the First Amendment.207  U.S. District Judge Raul A. Ramirez
found that branding expressive materials as “political propaganda” was
clearly pejorative and that Congress adopted the measure in order to discour-
age the dissemination of materials subject to the registration and disclosure
requirements.208  In consequence, the court held “that the use of the phrase
‘political propaganda’ in the Foreign Agents Registration Act abridges plain-
tiff’s freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”209
The Supreme Court granted direct review of the district court’s judgment
and reversed.210
Writing for the Keene majority, Justice John Paul Stevens characterized
the FARA’s mandatory registration and disclosure requirements as wholly
unobjectionable and fully consistent with the First Amendment.211  He flatly
rejected the district court’s conclusion that the term “political propaganda”
has an obvious and profound pejorative connotation.212  Accordingly, its
201 The films included If You Love This Planet, Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery, and Acid
from Heaven.  Keene, 481 U.S. at 468 n.3.
202 See id. at 470–71 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(j)).
203 22 U.S.C. § 614(b).
204 Id.
205 Id. § 611(j).
206 Keene, 481 U.S. at 470–71.
207 Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
208 Id. at 1124–26.
209 Id. at 1126.
210 See Keene, 481 U.S. at 469.
211 Id. at 480–81.
212 Id. at 483.
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compelled use to describe motion pictures, books, or magazines distributed
in the United States “places no burden on protected expression.”213
Of course, Lamont holds that the federal government’s labeling materi-
als from abroad as “communist political propaganda,” and requiring would-
be recipients in the United States to register with the government to receive
such materials, have an obvious and profound chilling effect—indeed, these
requirements could easily prove ruinous to those wishing to receive the infor-
mation.214  Why the operator of a movie theater would not fear serious
adverse consequences flowing from being identified as the purveyor of “polit-
ical propaganda” being distributed by the “agents of foreign principals” is far
from obvious.215  Justice Stevens blithely asserts that “Congress simply
required the disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures
that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propa-
ganda.”216  This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the Warren
Court’s serious concerns about the chilling effects of having to register with
the federal government to receive otherwise lawful material from abroad.
It is certainly true that “Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the
distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public
from conversion, confusion, or deceit.”217  Of course, these exact arguments
could have been made in Lamont—but they were not.  Justice Stevens posits
that “[b]y compelling some disclosure of information and permitting more,
the Act’s approach recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or inaccu-
rate speech contained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and
accurate speech.”218  However, were the materials at issue of purely domestic
origin, coerced speech requiring the distributor to affix a pejorative label—
for example, requiring materials distributed by a public employees labor
union to be described as “political propaganda distributed at the behest of
labor union agitators”—would be unthinkable.  The Supreme Court would
reflexively invalidate coerced speech that requires a speaker to denigrate her
own speech in a way conceded to be an effort to undermine its persuasive
force.219
Justice Stevens argued that the cure for the coerced speech problem was
not invalidation of the statute imposing the pejorative “foreign propaganda”
label, but rather to clarify “during, or after the film, or in wholly separate
context—that Canada’s interest in the consequences of nuclear war and acid
rain does not necessarily undermine the integrity or the persuasiveness of its
213 Id. at 480.
214 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
215 Keene, 481 U.S. at 469–70.
216 Id. at 480.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 481.
219 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–75
(2018) (invalidating as unconstitutional coerced speech a California law that imposed
mandatory disclosure requirements regarding the scope of reproductive health services
actually offered by crisis pregnancy centers).
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advocacy.”220  Thus, the remedy for coerced speech is more effectively
coerced speech—the irony runs very deep.221
Moreover, the federal government had to shoulder no serious burden of
justification at all in Keene—a result that seems quite remarkable.  Again, the
Supreme Court, in the context of domestic speech, has protected anonymous
speech and invalidated efforts to force political speakers to admit publicly
authorship of particular political messages.222  In fact, Justice Stevens wrote
the majority opinion invalidating Ohio’s proscription against anonymous
campaign advocacy.223  In the context of purely domestic political speech
related to an election or ballot measure, the more-speech-is-better rationale
went out the window because “[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pam-
phleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradi-
tion of advocacy and of dissent.”224  Moreover, “[a]nonymity is a shield from
the tyranny of the majority.”225
It bears noting that not a single reference to Meese v. Keene appears in
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in McIntyre.  Nor is there any suggestion
that mandatory information disclosures enhance and secure First Amend-
ment values in the domestic electoral context—rather they constitute a very
clear violation of the First Amendment.  The only distinction between Keene
and McIntyre involves the geographic source of the expression; domestic
speech cannot be subjected to mandatory disclosure requirements, whereas
speech that originates abroad, that was funded in whole or in part by a for-
eign government, may be subjected to mandatory, pejorative labeling
requirements.
To be sure, Keene was not a unanimous decision.  In a powerful and per-
suasive dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that “[b]y ignoring the practical
effect of the Act’s classification scheme, the Court unfortunately permits
Congress to accomplish by indirect means what it could not impose
directly—a restriction of appellee’s political speech.”226  The FARA clearly
burdens speech because it “inhibits dissemination of classified films.”227  It
will dissuade exhibitors from showing the films and “taints the message of a
classified film by lessening its credence with viewers.”228
The Rehnquist Court extended its deference to Congress and the Presi-
dent in cases involving transborder speech in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Committee.229  The majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin
220 Keene, 481 U.S. at 481.
221 Cf. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–75 (holding that coerced speech about controversial
issues is always unconstitutional, even if such coerced speech does not impede the ability of
a speaker to add an additional, alternative, message of her choosing).
222 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354–57 (1995).
223 Id. at 356.
224 Id. at 357.
225 Id.
226 Keene, 481 U.S. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 492.
229 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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Scalia, dismissed as irrelevant a claim that the federal government targeted
deportation proceedings against the plaintiffs “because of their affiliation
with a politically unpopular group,” namely the “Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (PFLP), a group that the Government characterize[d] as
an international terrorist and communist organization.”230
The initial deportation proceedings facially targeted the proposed
deportees on “advocacy-of-communism charges,” but the federal government
dropped this claim in favor of speech-neutral legal justifications for the
deportation proceedings.231  At a press conference, however, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service’s (INS) regional counsel stated that although
“the charges had been changed for tactical reasons,” that “the INS was still
seeking respondents’ deportation because of their affiliation with the
PFLP.”232  Despite the ideological motivation for the deportations, the
Supreme Court held that the proceedings were not subject to judicial
review.233
The potential chilling effect of targeted deportations based on political
activities was irrelevant to deciding whether the deportees’ selective enforce-
ment claims were judicially cognizable.234  The majority effectively deprived
aliens seeking to contest deportation the ability to press selective enforce-
ment claims before the federal courts.235  This was so because judicial review
of such claims, even if laced with First Amendment arguments, would require
“not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities
and techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as
in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques.”236
As with Zemel, Mandel, and Agee, federal court misgivings about dis-
rupting foreign policy and national security matters clearly motivated the
Supreme Court’s decision to defer to the political branches:
The Executive should not have to disclose its “real” reasons for deeming
nationals of a particular country a special threat—or indeed for simply wish-
ing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country’s
nationals—and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to
determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.237
This presumption against judicial review could perhaps be overcome in
“outrageous” circumstances, but “[w]hether or not there be such exceptions,
the general rule certainly applies here.”238  Accordingly, “[w]hen an alien’s
continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws,
230 Id. at 472–73.
231 See id. at 473–74.
232 Id. at 474.
233 Id. at 492.
234 See id. at 488 & n.10.
235 Id. at 488 n.10 (“Our holding generally deprives deportable aliens of the defense of
selective prosecution.”).
236 Id. at 490–91.
237 Id. at 491.
238 Id.
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the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the
additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that
supports terrorist activity.”239
Consistent with this posture of deference, the Roberts Court also has
used decision avoidance techniques to avoid reaching the merits in impor-
tant transborder speech cases. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA240 pro-
vides an illustrative example of this phenomenon.
Under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
the federal government may conduct regular surveillance of persons who do
not reside in the United States.241  Such surveillance is contingent on the
approval of the FISA court.  In Clapper, a group of U.S. persons who engage
in regular electronic communications with non-U.S. residents sued in federal
district court, seeking an order declaring section 702 unconstitutional.242
The entire predicate for surveillance under section 702 is communica-
tions activity that crosses the nation’s borders.  Amendments that Congress
enacted in 2008 authorize the conduct “of certain foreign intelligence sur-
veillance targeting the communications of non-U.S. persons located
abroad.”243  Under current law, surveillance undertaken under section 702
does not require any showing of probable cause or targeting of the federal
government’s surveillance activity.  Use of the data, however, is subject to sub-
stantive and procedural protections.244
If the federal government engaged in this sort of ongoing, dragnet sur-
veillance with respect to entirely domestic electronic communications, the
federal courts would easily find that the surveillance activity constitutes a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.  The chilling effect of such surveillance
also would trigger serious First Amendment concerns.  Accordingly, the
plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the section 702 surveillance program vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, and separation of pow-
ers principles.245
The Clapper Court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims;
instead, the majority held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to
challenge the “foreign” surveillance program.246  Justice Samuel Alito, writ-
ing for the Clapper majority, explained that the plaintiffs “theory of future
injury is too speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that
threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”247  This was so because “it
239 Id. at 491–92.  Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, reasoning that “[i]t
suffices to inquire whether the First Amendment necessitates immediate judicial considera-
tion of their selective enforcement plea.  I conclude that it does not.” Id. at 492 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
240 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
241 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
242 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401.
243 Id. at 404.
244 See id. at 404–05.
245 Id. at 407.
246 Id. at 402.
247 Id. at 401 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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is speculative whether the Government will imminently target communica-
tions to which respondents are parties.”248  Nor was “incurring costs in antici-
pation of non-imminent harm” sufficient to establish a constitutionally
cognizable injury because self-imposed costs could easily be used to defeat
the Article III standing requirement of injury in fact by permitting would-be
plaintiffs to essentially manufacture standing through entirely voluntary
expenditures.249
To be sure, Clapper was a five–four decision.  Justice Stephen Breyer,
writing for the minority, would have held that standing existed because
“there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some
electronic communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are par-
ties.”250  Thus, “[t]he majority is wrong when it describes the harm
threatened the plaintiffs as ‘speculative.’”251
Standing analysis should not turn on whether a constitutional harm
involves transborder speech activity or wholly domestic communications.  Yet,
one has to wonder if the Clapper majority was less concerned with judicial
review of the section 702 program because it targeted communications that
involve at least one foreign party.  If, as the preceding cases suggest, the Bill
of Rights applies more weakly outside the nation’s borders, it would be rea-
sonable to use discretionary merits-avoidance doctrines, like standing252 or
the political question doctrine,253 to avoid reaching the merits of the NSA’s
mass surveillance of international electronic communications.  It would have
been more intellectually defensible to reach this conclusion through an anal-
ysis of the merits—in other words, one could find that at least some of the
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the section 702 surveillance program, but
nevertheless deny relief on the merits—and on the theory that constitutional
rights apply either weakly or not at all when speech activity takes place, even
in part, outside the nation’s territory.
Indeed, in the final major transborder speech case of the Roberts Court
era, the Supreme Court essentially took this step because avoiding the merits
on standing or political question grounds was not a viable option.  In Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project,254 the Supreme Court essentially applied a weak,
tepid version of strict scrutiny to a content-based criminal restriction of the
freedom of speech and association out of concern that more demanding
judicial scrutiny would interfere with important foreign affairs and national
security objectives.  To be sure, as Professor Zick observes, “[c]ourts seem to
treat any utterance or association that happens to intersect with territorial
borders as activity that touches on foreign affairs and implicates national
248 Id. at 411.
249 See id. at 415–18, 422.
250 Id. at 431 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
251 Id.
252 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
253 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–17 (1962).
254 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
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security.”255  Even so, however, Humanitarian Law Project’s abject deference
to the political branches—at the cost of proscribing core expressive activity
that would be vigorously protected under the First Amendment at home—
makes the decision rather remarkable.256
Humanitarian Law Project involved a First Amendment challenge to a fed-
eral statute that criminalized “knowingly provid[ing] material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”257  Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP) sought to teach peaceful dispute resolution techniques to the Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK); the federal government listed the PKK as a “for-
eign terrorist organization,” and, accordingly, providing the PKK with “mate-
rial support” constituted a crime.258  HLP argued that, as applied to their
associational activities with the PKK, which involved instruction in peaceful
dispute resolution techniques, section 2339B violated the First
Amendment.259
The Supreme Court rejected HLP’s First Amendment claims.260  The
statute was not impermissibly vague in proscribing “material support”
because “a person of ordinary intelligence” would understand the statute’s
scope of application.261  The majority also rejected HLP’s more general free
speech claims, holding that because “[p]roviding foreign terrorist groups
with material support in any form” has the effect of furthering terrorism,262
the federal government had “adequately substantiated [its] determination
that, to serve the Government’s interest in preventing terrorism, it was neces-
sary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert
advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if the sup-
porters meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent ends.”263  Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, writing for the majority, observed that “[a]t bottom, plaintiffs
simply disagree with the considered judgment of Congress and the Executive
that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organiza-
tion—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of that
organization.”264
255 ZICK, supra note 4, at 73.
256 Id. at 184 (“Humanitarian Law Project is a troubling precedent.”).  More specifically,
Zick argues that Humanitarian Law Project is “in conflict with traditional First Amendment
justifications, which emphasize a commitment to protecting peaceful political speech in
the interest of self-governance and the search for truth.” Id.
257 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006)).
258 Id. at 7–9.
259 Id. at 8.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 24–25.
262 Id. at 32.
263 Id. at 36.
264 Id. But cf. Kahn, supra note 16, at 333–34 (“Official disapproval of the traveler or
his noncriminal purposes in traveling does not entitle the state to restrict the citizen as a
‘potential match[ ]’ in the ‘international tinderbox.’” (quoting Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d
561, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958))).  Professor Kahn argues that “[s]o long as the citizen’s actions are not treasonous,
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The sweep and scope of the decision is astonishing.  In the 1950s and
1960s, the Supreme Court invalidated state and federal laws that made mere
membership in the Communist Party or affiliated organizations a criminal
act; the Warren Court held that criminalizing material support of domestic
communist organizations was incompatible with the freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association safeguarded by the First Amendment.265  Even if
membership in a local branch of the Soviet Communist Party might lend
legitimacy and credibility to the local organization’s foreign parent, the fed-
eral government could not proscribe domestic communist organizations or
criminalize mere membership in them.  By way of contrast, however, Humani-
tarian Law Project holds that the slightest possibility of lending “legitimacy” to
organizations like the PKK constitutes a harm that the federal government
may legislate to prevent—using the criminal law as its means of censoring
speech.
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts asserts that any kind of association and
coordinated activity by U.S. citizens with members of foreign terrorist organi-
zations abroad “helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy
that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to
immediately dangerous, or contrary to some contractual obligation made to the state, a
citizen’s travel is none of the state’s business.” Id. at 335.  Professor Aziz Huq posits that
“although the Court framed its analysis around the compelling interest in ‘combating ter-
rorism’ directed toward the United States, much of what followed in fact turned on the
distinct, foreign-affairs related government interest in maintaining cordial relations with
countries such as Turkey and Sri Lanka.”  Huq, supra note 16, at 24.
265 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Communist Party of the U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see also Cole, supra note 16, at
172 (“[T]he Communist Party cases might have been decided differently had Congress
imposed restrictions on association with the Soviet rather than the American Community
Party.”).  For relevant discussions of the Red Scare prosecutions of individual citizens for
mere membership in or association with the Communist Party in the United States—and
the Supreme Court’s emphatic rejection of such prosecutions—see WALTER GELLHORN,
AMERICAN RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTION IN ACTION 82–83 (1960) and Marc Rohr, Communists
and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 66–97 (1991).  Indeed, Professor Marc Rohr observes that “[a]fter the Scales and
SACB [Subversive Activities Control Board] decisions of 1961, every first amendment chal-
lenge to ‘loyalty’ laws that reached the Supreme Court in the 1960’s was successful,” mean-
ing that even serious advocacy of a proletariat-led revolution could not be the subject of
criminal charges.  Rohr, supra, at 91; see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 & n.2
(1969) (per curiam) (holding that the government may not “forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” and
characterizing prior cases, such as Yates, as having adopted and applied this approach).
After the Warren Court’s landmark 1969 decision in Brandenburg, in the absence of con-
vincing evidence that a particular call to action will produce imminent unlawful conduct,
advocating violent revolution enjoys full First Amendment protection. Id. at 447–48; see
Rohr, supra, at 97–100 (discussing Brandenburg and its effective rejection of criminal prose-
cutions for advocacy of a violent Communist revolution absent an imminent risk that calls
to action would actually precipitate unlawful acts).
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raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”266  Professor David
Cole rightly objects that Roberts “engaged in only the most deferential
review, and upheld the law in the absence of any argument, much less evi-
dentiary showing, that prohibiting plaintiffs’ speech was necessary or nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling interest.”267  Moreover, “the Court’s
scrutiny was . . . neither strict nor fatal, nor even demanding” but rather
represented “only the most deferential review.”268
Despite the Chief Justice’s claims to the contrary, this kind of “parade of
horribles” reasoning would apply with no less force to mere membership in
local affiliates of foreign organizations (such as the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union) on the theory that any domestic support of local affiliates
lends the foreign parent organization “legitimacy.”  Accordingly, the distinc-
tion must rest on the transborder character of the First Amendment activ-
ity—and not on the nature of the activity itself.  This has the odd effect of
making the government’s power to censor speech a function of its location—
rather than its potential social cost.
To be sure, Humanitarian Law Project does not overturn the Warren
Court’s precedents that afforded transborder speech First Amendment pro-
tection.  Instead, the majority opinion distinguishes them away because the
locus of the First Amendment activities protected by the Warren Court’s
precedents were largely domestic in character.269  Chief Justice Roberts
emphasizes that “[w]e . . . do not suggest that Congress could extend the
same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic organiza-
tions.”270  Moreover, lower federal courts have relied on this caveat to reject
the federal government’s efforts to criminalize membership in domestic affil-
iates of foreign organizations deemed to have terroristic objectives.271
Humanitarian Law Project essentially creates an exception to the First
Amendment for speech activity that takes place outside the United States.272
266 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30.
267 Cole, supra note 16, at 148.
268 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.
270 Id.
271 See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 660 F.3d
1019, 1051–54 (9th Cir. 2011) (validating First Amendment claim because “[t]he entities
in HLP were wholly foreign, whereas AHIF-Oregon is, at least in some respects, a domestic
organization” and “content-based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment”
when such speech relates to “a domestic branch of an international organization”),
amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc by 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012).  As Profes-
sor Huq has observed, “some commentators have suggested the opinion [in Humanitarian
Law Project] has only small practical significance because it does not reach domestic organi-
zations.”  Huq, supra note 16, at 22.  However, this effort to renormalize Humanitarian Law
Project ignores the importance of transborder speech to the process of democratic self-
government. See supra notes 91–113 and accompanying text.
272 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1010 n.150 (2011); see
also ZICK, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that the Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project
“posits a foreign-domestic distinction with respect to First Amendment freedoms that sug-
gests full constitutional protection applies only to intraterritorial communications and
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It does so to avoid the prospect of the federal judiciary applying the First
Amendment in ways that would potentially interfere with foreign affairs and
national security objectives that Congress and the President seek to secure.
For example, U.S. foreign relations policy could be adversely affected by
transborder speech because it “strain[s] the United States’ relationships with
its allies and undermin[es] cooperative efforts between nations to prevent
terrorist attacks.”273  Moreover, the political branches are “entitled to defer-
ence” when assessing the potential adverse effects of speech activity abroad
because of the “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and for-
eign affairs.”274
Even though Congress imposed a content-based restriction on speech,
via the criminal law, and did nothing to narrowly tailor its regulation to
directly target only unlawful activity, would-be speakers must lose their ability
to exercise First Amendment rights abroad because the judgment of the
political branches regarding the requisite balance to be struck “is entitled to
significant weight.”275  Despite purporting to apply strict scrutiny to section
2339B, the majority applied something much closer to rationality review;
neither Congress nor the President labored under any obligation to prove
the factual predicates that supported a flat ban on speech activity and free
association with proscribed organizations abroad.  By way of contrast, the leg-
islative record supporting the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of
2002 spanned over 100,000 pages—but failed to incent much, if any, judicial
deference.276
Humanitarian Law Project completes the turn that began under the Bur-
ger Court in cases like Mandel and Agee.  In order to avoid interfering with
foreign policy and national security objectives, the federal courts will apply a
“junior varsity” version of the First Amendment to speech activity that takes
place outside the physical borders of the United States.  The potential social
cost of speech activity is not usually a basis for censoring speech inside the
nation’s borders—but it constitutes a compelling interest outside of them.
This approach is mistaken—at least if the value of speech to the project of
associations”); Cole, supra note 16, at 164 (“There is certainly reason to believe that the
analysis in Humanitarian Law Project is not generally applicable.”).
273 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 32.
274 Id. at 33–34.  On the other hand, there is good cause for concern that the political
branches’ claimed foreign affairs and national security justifications for regulating or ban-
ning transborder speech activity could be merely pretextual. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at
941 (“But when the nature of that foreign policy interest is explored, it becomes clear that
the government’s concrete worry is that a particular speech, pejoratively labeled as ‘propa-
ganda’ or ‘disinformation,’ will cause a public reaction in the United States that will com-
plicate implementation of the administration’s foreign policy objectives.”).
275 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 36. But cf. Cole, supra note 16, at 149 (“For
the first time in its history, the Court upheld the criminalization of speech advocating only
nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that such speech might unintentionally assist a third
party in criminal wrongdoing.”).
276 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 412 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The total record [Congress] compiled was 100,000 pages long.”).
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democratic self-government bears no necessary relationship to a speaker’s
identity or motive for speaking.277
IV. MAPPING THE FIRST AMENDMENT ONTO TRANSBORDER SPEECH: THE
RELEVANCE OF MEIKLEJOHN’S DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT
THEORY OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The value of speech has nothing to do with its foreign or domestic locus.
The logic of Citizens United and the Meiklejohn democratic self-government
theory of the First Amendment requires that the federal courts afford speech
meaningful First Amendment protection regardless of its transborder nature.
Using the nation’s borders as a basis for censoring speech is antithetical to
everything that the First Amendment ostensibly stands for—and, accordingly,
cannot be accepted as a persuasive interpretation of its meaning, scope, and
import.
If the central insight of Citizens United holds true—the identity of the
speaker and the speaker’s motivations for entering the marketplace of ideas
are irrelevant to the potential value of speech to its audience—the failure to
protect cross-border speech cannot be justified in normative, policy, or doc-
trinal terms.278  Simply put, either the government may regulate speech
based on the identity and motive of a speaker or it may not.  Either Citizens
United or Humanitarian Law Project was wrongly decided, for these decisions
rest on fundamentally incompatible premises about the central meaning of
the First Amendment.  In short, if we truly believe that speech related to
democratic self-government requires vigorous and vigilant protection against
a censorial federal government, then we should embrace the constitutional
logic of Citizens United and reject Humanitarian Law Project’s embarrassingly
halting, weak, and grossly underprotective vision of the freedom of speech
for the citizens of a democratic polity.
The facts of the case are straightforward.  As part of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, a comprehensive campaign finance reform pack-
age, Congress enacted a statutory provision that prohibited corporations and
277 See id. at 339–41 (majority opinion).
278 Of course, in the real world, the source of news or information obviously plays an
important role in its credibility.  A reliable news source, such as the New York Times or Wall
Street Journal, which observes standards of journalistic ethics and relies on maintaining its
journalistic credibility to secure its market position, should be deemed a more reliable and
trustworthy source of news and information than a Wikipedia entry or an Infowars post.  In
this sense, then, the identity of a speaker is crucially important to a reader or listener. See
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 983–90
(2005) (noting that the identity of a speaker often prefigures the credibility of information
to an audience and documenting the problematic practice of the government deploying
so-called “sock puppet” identities to obfuscate the government’s authorship of messages in
order to enhance the credibility of them with the general public); Helen Norton & Dani-
elle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 935–38 (2010) (noting
that a speaker’s identity can often prefigure the credibility of the speech to an audience
and noting that government sometimes attempts to hide its identity in order to enhance
the credibility of its speech).
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labor unions alike from engaging in “electioneering communication,”279
which the statute defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communica-
tion” that refers to “a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and
made thirty days before a primary election or sixty days prior to a general
election.280  Fearing that the Federal Election Commission would find that
broadcast of Hillary: The Movie, a film highly critical of Hillary Rodham Clin-
ton, would constitute an “electioneering communication” falling within sec-
tion 441b’s proscription against such speech by corporations and labor
unions, Citizens United, the movie’s producer, sought a preliminary injunc-
tion holding section 441b unconstitutional as applied to the film.281  The
district court denied the injunction and the court of appeals affirmed the
district court’s judgment.282
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.  In doing so, it over-
ruled a 2003 precedent that had specifically upheld section 441b against a
First Amendment challenge283 and also a 1990 decision that had sustained
limits on corporate political speech because such speech could have a distor-
tionary effect on the political process.284  After overruling these precedents,
the Citizens United majority proceeded to hold that section 441b violated the
First Amendment because the statute’s “purpose and effect are to silence
entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”285
Justice Anthony Kennedy posited that “[t]he First Amendment protects
speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”286  He emphasized
that the government may not intervene in information markets in order to
handpick free speech winners and losers: “The Government may not by these
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”287  This rule reflects
the fact that the value of information and ideas does not necessarily correlate
with either the speaker’s identity or motive for speaking.  Moreover, Citizens
United embraces a theory of audience autonomy that permits readers, listen-
ers, and viewers to assess for themselves the reliability and value of speech;
the decision squarely rejects government paternalism as a basis for imposing
speech regulations in the political marketplace of ideas.288  In consequence,
279 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).
280 Id. § 434(f)(3)A).
281 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21.
282 Id. at 322.
283 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S.
310.
284 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–60 (1990), overruled
by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
285 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
286 Id. at 341.
287 Id. at 340–41.
288 See id. at 339–41. But cf. TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COM-
MERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 121–24 (2012) (arguing that government paternalism can
protect consumers from false and misleading speech, that unregulated speech markets
merely constitute “paternalism of a different stripe, tough love—hard paternalism rather
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the government may not use a speaker’s identity or motive for speaking as a
basis for imposing silence.289  As Justice Kennedy stated the point, “[s]peech
is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.”290
If these premises are correct—namely that the value of information and
ideas is simply not a function of a speaker’s identity or motive for speaking
and paternalistic government interventions in the political marketplace of
ideas are inherently and unacceptably distortionary—then it should also be
the case that a speaker’s geographic location is equally irrelevant to the poten-
tial value of speech to the political marketplace of ideas and to the dangers of
paternalistic government censorship of core political speech.  After all, if “it
is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to
obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes,”291 the location of information otherwise potentially relevant to
the process of democratic self-government should be irrelevant to its pro-
tected status under the First Amendment.
Given that “no basis [exists] for the proposition that, in the context of
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfa-
vored speakers,”292 the contemporary Supreme Court’s failure to provide
meaningful protection to transborder speech activity is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to reconcile with core First Amendment values.  A theory of the First
Amendment premised, at least in part, on a paradigm of audience (voter)
autonomy would seem to require that transborder speech be no less pro-
tected than speech that happens to take place within the metes and bounds
of the United States.
If, as the Citizens United majority argued, “[t]he right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to pro-
tect it,”293 speech that originates outside the nation’s borders should be no
less protected than speech that originates within those boarders.  So too, if
citizens may engage in free speech, free association, and assembly in order to
advance the process of democratic self-government at home, then U.S. citi-
than soft, protective paternalism,” and that government interventions in speech markets to
weed out false and misleading information do not “in any way interfere[ ] with listeners’
interests”).
289 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
290 Id. at 339.  Moreover, it bears noting that in today’s marketplace of ideas,
“[i]nformation flows at great speed, and in remarkable quantity, across our national bor-
ders.”  Zick, supra note 3, at 1544.  These global information flows are plainly relevant to
the process of democratic deliberation necessary to democratic self-government. See
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 25–27.  As Professor Meiklejohn argues, under the First
Amendment, “[t]he freedom of ideas shall not be abridged,” id. at 27, and the local or
foreign source of an idea is entirely irrelevant to its potential value to the electorate. See id.
at xiii–xiv, 90–91.
291 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 339.
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zens should be no less free to engage in such activities abroad.294  Speech
relevant to democratic self-government must enjoy the First Amendment’s
most robust protection.  Simply put, if “political speech must prevail against
laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence,”295 then the
geographic locus of the political speech should not be the controlling factor
in First Amendment analysis.
Under the logic of Humanitarian Law Project, however, the protection of
political expression depends critically on its domestic or transborder charac-
ter.  This outcome simply cannot be reconciled with Justice Kennedy’s soar-
ing poetics to the centrality of free and wide-open speech to the maintenance
of democratic self-government and his Cassandra-esque warnings about the
danger of permitting government to banish disfavored speakers from the
political marketplace of ideas.296  Moreover, Humanitarian Law Project’s rea-
soning and outcome also cannot be reconciled with a theory of freedom of
expression that justifies protecting speech because of its integral relationship
to the process of democratic self-government.
Professor Meiklejohn, arguably the most prominent proponent of the
democratic self-government theory of the First Amendment, argued strongly
that U.S. citizens must have access to speakers and ideas regardless of their
domestic or foreign origin.  He inveighed Attorney General Tom C. Clark’s
adoption of regulations that “restrict[ed] the freedom of speech of tempo-
rary foreign visitors to our shores” and “declare[d] that certain classes of visi-
tors are forbidden, except by special permission, to engage in public
discussion of public policy while they are among us.”297  Meiklejohn, out-
raged, asked “Why may we not hear what these men from other countries,
other systems of government, have to say?”298  He condemned efforts to pro-
tect voters from speakers and ideas “too ‘dangerous’ for us to hear.”299  To
accept the exclusion of speech, speakers, and ideas based on their foreign
origin “would seem to be an admission that we are intellectually and morally
unfit to play our part in what Justice Holmes has called the ‘experiment’ of
self-government.”300
Meiklejohn states the point in forceful, yet highly persuasive, terms.  The
First Amendment protects the distribution of books like Adolf Hitler’s Mein
Kampf, Vladimir Lenin’s The State and Revolution, and Friedrich Engels and
294 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at xiii–xiv, 88–91.
295 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
296 In fact, the Citizens United majority declined to decide whether the federal govern-
ment would have a compelling interest in banning speech by “foreign individuals or
associations.” Id. at 362 (observing that “[s]ection 441b is not limited to corporations or
associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreign
shareholders” and accordingly “would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, that the
Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political
process”).
297 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at xiii.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. at xiv.
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Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto not because of “the financial interests of a
publisher, or a distributor, or even of a writer.”301  Instead, “[w]e are saying
that the citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under
their own institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly every-
thing that can be said in favor of those institutions, everything that can be
said against them.”302  In sum, “[t]he unabridged freedom of public discus-
sion is the rock on which our government stands.”303
Meiklejohn could not have been more clear, or emphatic, in his rejec-
tion of using the transborder nature of speech or speakers as a basis for
restricting, much less banning, access by U.S. citizens to people, information,
ideas, and ideologies.  To threaten American citizens with criminal prosecu-
tion for interacting abroad with foreign political organizations (such as the
PKK)304 or attempting to visit Cuba in order to assess the efficacy of the U.S.
policy of embargo and isolation,305 is to undermine, if not betray, the process
of wide-open public discussion of public affairs that Meiklejohn believes to be
crucial to maintaining the ability of citizens to hold the institutions of govern-
ment accountable through the electoral process.306  As he explained,
“[w]hen a free man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by
someone else, by some scholar or administrator or legislator.”307  Instead,
“[t]he voters must have it, all of them.”308  If we accept Meiklejohn’s argu-
ments, then U.S. citizens must be free to interact with both foreign speakers
and ideas—at home, in the United States, but also abroad.309
301 Id. at 91.
302 Id.; see ZICK, supra note 4, at 20 (“Whether we like it or not, we occupy a world
where cultures and legal systems are intertwined.”); Cole, supra note 16, at 170 (“The First
Amendment should protect our right to read The Guardian (UK), as it does our right to
read the New York Times, and our right to post blogs on sites immediately accessible in a
distant foreign land, as it does our right to hand out a leaflet on a [domestic] neighbor-
hood street corner.”).
303 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 91.
304 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–39 (2010).
305 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
306 See Kahn, supra note 16, at 348 (“To prevent a citizen from leaving the United States
because that travel is asserted to be contrary to the country’s foreign policy interests is to
engage in a form of countrywide house arrest on grounds that sound uncomfortably close
to preventive detention on the basis of future dangerousness (which itself has been held to
require strict scrutiny).”); Kamenshine, supra note 16, at 894 (arguing that the federal
courts should “afford foreign travel by United States citizens a significant degree of first
amendment protection”).
307 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 88.
308 Id.
309 To be sure, Professor Meiklejohn’s specific examples all involve the domestic con-
sumption of foreign books and interactions with foreign, noncitizen speakers, within the
United States. See id. at 88–91.  However, the logic of his position would necessarily have to
encompass the ability to go abroad to gather the information necessary to cast a well-
informed vote. See id. at 25–26, 88–89. But cf. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17 (rejecting a First
Amendment–based right to travel to Cuba to learn firsthand about conditions there under
Fidel Castro because “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow”).
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So too, trying to discourage U.S. voters from considering ideas and argu-
ments from abroad by labeling films “political propaganda” being distributed
by “foreign principals and their agents”310 seems fundamentally inconsistent
with a theory of freedom of speech that protects expression from paternalis-
tic government efforts to control, or even merely to tilt, the marketplace of
political ideas.  Just as banning a celebrated foreign Marx scholar from visit-
ing the United States in order to lecture and speak to and with audiences
comprised of U.S. citizens eager to hear and interact with him311 transgresses
our core constitutional commitment to maintaining a public debate that is
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”312  This is so because, as Professor
Cole posits, “[c]ommunication across borders furthers many of the values
said to be served by the First Amendment.”313
Meikejohn emphasizes, in a well-functioning democracy, that:
The voters . . . must be made as wise as possible.  The welfare of the commu-
nity requires that those who decide issues shall understand them.  They must
know what they are voting about. . . . When men govern themselves, it is
they—and no one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and
unfairness and danger.  And that means that unwise ideas must have a hear-
ing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-
American as well as American.314
Moreover, “[t]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-
government.”315
Citizens United, whatever one’s views of the desirability of limits on corpo-
rate or union speech favoring or opposing candidates for federal elective
office, reflects and incorporates these insights—government simply lacks the
constitutional competence to adopt paternalistic regulations that seek to pro-
tect voters from bad ideas propagated by self-interested speakers.  Audience
autonomy constitutes the trump card; the public can judge for itself the
merit, or lack thereof, in any particular instance of political speech.  By way
of contrast, however, Humanitarian Law Project permits the government to
proscribe First Amendment activity because it might impede or burden the
achievement of the federal government’s foreign relations or national secur-
ity objectives.  Under this unfortunate precedent, the federal government
may suppress, through the criminal law, transborder speech that it deems too
310 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–85 (1987).
311 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–70 (1972). But cf. Cole, supra note 16,
at 170 (“Exchange with foreign voices informs citizens about world affairs, and thereby
furthers self-government.”).
312 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
313 Cole, supra note 16, at 170.
314 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 25–26; see ZICK, supra note 4, at 212 (“U.S. citizens
ought to enjoy protection for free speech, press, assembly, and petition rights without
regard to frontiers or borders . . . . Treating expressive rights as portable will facilitate
citizens’ participation in global conversation and commingling.”); Cole, supra note 16, at
169 (“[C]ommunication and association with foreign organizations is, and should be, pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”).
315 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 27.
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dangerous to tolerate—because it might lend “legitimacy” to foreign organi-
zations that it opposes.316  However, a free people in a democratic polity
should be entitled to use free speech and their votes to set or amend govern-
ment policy—rather than the other way around (i.e., government policies
controlling the scope of permissible democratic discourse).
The normative position that animates Citizens United rests in a funda-
mental tension with the theoretical basis of Humanitarian Law Project: it is
simply not plausible to posit that government interventions in speech mar-
kets are distortionary—except when they are not. Citizens United posits that
the First Amendment constitutes a kind of structural check on government,
literally “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power.”317  If one
presumes that government attempts to regulate or control the political mar-
ketplace of ideas are inherently distortionary, it would make sense to subject
such efforts to beady-eyed judicial scrutiny.
On the other hand, Humanitarian Law Project vests government with tre-
mendous power to regulate even core political speech—to criminalize it, in
fact—if the speech might present an obstacle to the federal government’s for-
eign policy or national security objectives.318  The risk of government abus-
ing its power to censor speech, and thereby distorting the mechanisms of
democratic accountability,319 exists regardless of the domestic or foreign
locus of speech.  One cannot coherently take both sides on the fundamental
question of whether, as a general matter, government interventions in speech
markets enhance or degrade the marketplace of ideas.  Nevertheless, the consti-
tutional logic of Humanitarian Law Project would support the kinds of domes-
tic speech regulations that the Citizens United majority so forcefully rejected as
fundamentally incompatible with the central meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment.
In sum, the threat that an organization and its ideas present to the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare simply does not correlate with the organiza-
tion’s domestic or foreign nature.  If “[t]he primary purpose of the First
Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand
the issues which bear upon our common life,”320 then the federal courts can-
not permit the transborder nature of speech to prefigure its protected, or
unprotected, status under the First Amendment.321  A thorough and mean-
316 Cf. Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 744 (“Democratic principles are rein-
forced, not diminished, by judicial review that prevents a transient majority from tamper-
ing with the flow of information necessary to assure its continued political
accountability.”).
317 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
318 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–39 (2010).  It bears noting that
the Supreme Court issued both decisions during the same term.
319 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (positing that free speech constitutes “an essential
mechanism of democracy” because it serves as “the means to hold officials accountable to
the people”).
320 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 88–89.
321 See Kamenshine, supra note 16, at 876 (“The business of government does not
include using its regulatory power to shape a political viewpoint.”); Neuborne & Shapiro,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 45 17-DEC-18 11:53
2018] transborder  speech 517
ingful commitment to democratic self-government, and the process of delib-
eration that facilitates it, requires that “no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no
belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from [the citi-
zenry].”322  Yet the Supreme Court, from the Burger Court era to the pre-
sent, has failed to respect and advance these principles when transborder
speech is at issue.  We can and should expect more civic courage from our
nation’s highest constitutional court.323  Moreover, a theory of the First
Amendment resting on the dual jurisprudential pillars of speaker autonomy
and distrust of government censorship requires a full measure of constitu-
tional protection for transborder speech.
supra note 8, at 748 (“Given the danger to a free society created by widespread censorship
at the national border, reviewing courts should insist upon proof, not merely that speech
might damage our foreign policy or even our national security, but that it is reasonably
likely to do so.”).  Kamenshine concludes that “[r]egulation controlling speech directly
related to issues of public policy demands strict review.”  Kamenshine, supra note 16, at
878.  On the other hand, however, Neuborne and Shapiro think judicial vigilance is
unlikely to occur in transborder speech cases because “[i]n national border cases . . . the
nature of the asserted governmental interest often involves assessments of fact and policy
beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary, making judges extremely wary of
estimating the importance of an asserted government justification.”  Neuborne & Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 747.  Because of this reticence to interfere with foreign relations and
national security efforts, federal judges feel “bound to defer to any justification that [is]
not facially invalid.” Id.  To be sure, the potential social costs of transborder speech could
be quite high—but those costs do not seem to affect the willingness of the federal courts to
protect domestic speech activity that could easily produce very serious adverse effects
abroad—such as the infamous fundamentalist Florida preacher Terry Jones—who con-
ducts public Koran burnings. See Kevin Sieff, Florida Pastor Terry Jones’s Koran Burning Has
Far-Reaching Effect, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/florida-pastor-terry-joness-koran-burning-has-far-reaching-effect/2011/04/02/
AFpiFoQC_story.html?utm_term=.7258dd23273c; see also Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the
Confluence of National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 386–91,
397–99 (2017) (providing an excellent historical and doctrinal overview of free speech
“national security exceptionalism” and positing that national security concerns, including
concerns about terrorism, “are . . . somewhat inflated”).  Professor Chen argues that “the
legal system ought to be skeptical about calls to relax the free speech protections surround-
ing unlawful advocacy” and cautions against “a tendency to overreact to what are perceived
as new types of national security threats.” Id. at 399.
322 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 89.
323 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 748 (“[A] genuine threat to national
security must arise before the national border can be used to impede the free flow of
ideas.”).  See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) (positing that,
consistent with the arguments set forth in Justice Louis Brandeis’s iconic concurring opin-
ion in Whitney, the process of democratic deliberation necessarily requires that society tol-
erate speech that could impose serious social costs).  As Professor Zick has argued,
“[e]xtension of First Amendment protections to U.S. citizens located abroad would seem
to be supported by text, theory, and precedent.”  Zick, supra note 3, at 1593.  Moreover,
“[t]he First Amendment’s text does not suggest any geographic limitation.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Warren Court pioneered First Amendment protection for trans-
border speech.  The Burger Court failed to expand on the limited scope of
protection that the Warren Court conveyed on transborder speech—but
declined to expressly overrule the Warren Court’s precedents.  By way of con-
trast, however, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts moved both existing doc-
trine and practice toward a more general posture of abject judicial deference
to Congress and the President when the political branches seek to regulate,
or even proscribe, transborder speech activity that takes place abroad.
As Professor Zick observes “the First Amendment has a critically impor-
tant transborder dimension.”324  First Amendment theory and doctrine can
and must take account of transborder speech as a potentially important part
of the larger process of democratic deliberation.  To be sure, the federal
courts’ consistent failure to protect transborder speech vigorously and vigi-
lantly suggests that securing change may take time and involve incremental,
rather than wholesale, improvements.  Even if this is so, however, Neuborne
and Shapiro are surely correct to posit that “the assumption that present judi-
cial attitudes are immutable, or that they even reflect a coherent legal theory,
is mistaken.”325
The case for change is not difficult to make: It is impossible to reconcile
the core First Amendment reasoning of Citizens United with that of Humanita-
rian Law Project. Citizens United constitutes an extended argument that the
value and relevance of speech to the project of democratic self-governance
does not depend on a speaker’s identity or motive for speaking.  The deci-
sion also reflects deep skepticism about government efforts to censor or even
to shape the political marketplace of ideas by banishing disfavored speakers.
Yet Humanitarian Law Project reflects precisely the opposite attitude—a posi-
tion of reflexive trust in government—and rests on the assumption that a
speaker’s identity and motive for speaking (at least in the transborder con-
text) may serve as a basis for sustaining government regulations that nakedly
censor even core political speech.  If the Supreme Court actually meant what
it said with such force in Citizens United about the First Amendment being
premised on a profound mistrust of government interventions in speech
markets,326 then the federal courts can and should apply the First Amend-
ment more reliably and robustly to transborder speech.
In conclusion, First Amendment activity should not go unprotected sim-
ply because it happens to possess a transborder element.  Current First
Amendment theory and doctrine fails—quite badly—to respect the idea that
the First Amendment protects a public debate that will be “uninhibited,
324 ZICK, supra note 4, at 7.
325 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 765.
326 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised on mistrust of govern-
mental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints.  Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others.” (citation omitted)).
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robust, and wide-open.”327  If the Supreme Court’s efforts to prohibit the
government from distorting the political marketplace of ideas reflect a mean-
ingful and deep-seated jurisprudential commitment—rather than a merely
rhetorical one—a serious course correction is both needed and long
overdue.
327 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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